January 1941

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. H.D. Drew, O.B.E., M.C.

Place

Date

Hour

Summary of Events and Information

References to Appendices

Amiriya

1

CO, Sqn. Comds., and IO went on reconnaissance of the training area and firing areas.

2

Work continued on preparation of tanks.

3

CO’s conference 09.30 hours to discuss Special Pay and other matters; and at 18.30 hours to discuss work on tanks in Ordnance and deficiencies in equipment.

4-8

No incident, work on tanks continues.

9

OC 2 RTR visited unit. Work on tanks continues.

10

CO’s conference 14.00 hours to discuss matters concerned with orders received at Bde. conference at 10.00 hours. These orders make the Bn. move on January 19^th composed of 2. A 10 Sqns. and One Sqn. light tanks. K.D.G. The A.13 Sqn. “C” to remain behind while tanks are modified. All personnel in “A”, “B” and HQ Sqns. to go on leave immediately, if not been on leave already. “C” Sqn. to cancel their leave parties temporarily. Orders given for “A”, “B” and HQ Sqns. to fire on 16^th and 17^th January.

11

CO’s conference 14.00 hours. Orders to send in “B” vehicles for camouflage painting given, and state of preparations discussed.

12

Heavy sandstorm all day. 20 “B” Vehicles and 5 Scout Cars painted with Desert Camouflage at RAOC Workshops. Work on modifying tanks continued. Orders for inspection of air filters on A.10 for cracks in welding received from Brigade. All Fordson trucks issued in Egypt to be put off road until fan assembly modified. All radiators on A.13 to be lifted.

13

Information received from Brigade that “C” Sqn. might still go with the Bn. Work on tanks continues.

14

Preparations continue. Date of firing delayed one day to allow tanks to get ready in time. Orders from Brigade saying that move had been subject of request for delay of about 1 week so that A.13s could be ready.

15

Preparations continue. Heavy sandstorm.

16

Heavy sandstorm. “A” and “B” Sqns. (less 2 Troops “B” Sqn.) followed later by “B” Echelon moved out of camp 13.50 hours and leaguered in Firing Area. Orders received from Brigade for the attachment of Major Rash, Capt. Lemesurier and 2/Lt. D.N. MacDonald to the 4^th Armd. Brigade.

17

Range practice continues. 18.30 hours message received that Major General J.C. Tilly, D.S.O., M.C., had died at Bardia.

18

Major Rash, Capt. Lemesurier and 2/Lt. D.N. MacDonald with two trucks left for 4^th Armd. Brigade (located near El Adem) sandstorm increased during afternoon.

19

Representative sqn. of Bn., commanded by Major G.F. Talbot attended the funeral of Major General J.C. Tilly. Tank of “C” Sqn. was used as carriage.

20

Preparations of vehicles continue. “A” and “B” Sqns. almost completed except for breakdowns. “C” Sqn. nearing completion. Most faults appear to be due to the sea voyage and lack of maintenance.

21

The CO gave a lecture to officers and tank comds. on fire tactics.

22

“A” and “B” Sqns. went out to ranges. Practice leaguer.

23

“C” Sqn. went out to ranges. Firing commenced.

24

Bn. on ranges firing. Warning order for Bn. to move to battle area. Tank Sqns. returned from ranges. Bn. to form as A.13 Bn. taking over A.13s from 3^rd R.T.R. in place of A.10. Major Rash and party recalled.

25

Orders issued for 1^st stage of move.

26

Advance party composed as under left in 3 – 15 cwt. trucks 09.00 hours. Capt. Coombes, 2/Lt. Hemmings, 2/Lt. Steevens.

27

Scout Cars left 09.00 hours. Transport left 10.00 hours. “C” sqn. left by rail, 2 – tanks “C” Sqn., 1 A.13 and 1 A.10 broke down. Rail flats too small in may cases, causing superficial damage to tanks in loading.

In the Field

28

“B” Sqn. by rail. 2 – “C” Sqn. tanks loaded by L.R.S. transport arrived camp area about 21.00 hours having travelled in a sandstorm. 2 – “B” Sqn. lorries did not arrive.

29

CO and Adj. left Amiriya by road, arrived camp 19.00 hours. “A” Sqn. left Amiriya by rail. Search started for “B” Sqn. lorries.

30

Brigadier and B.M. spent night with Bn. “B” Sqn. lorries not found. Orders received for modification of A.13 front suspension, i.e., removing shock absorbers. Work started.

31

“B” Sqn. lorries located W. of Tobruk. Ordered to wait at Sollum. Modification work continues.

February 1941

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. H.D. Drew, O.B.E., M.C.

Place

Date

Hour

Summary of Events and Information

References to Appendices

In the Field

1

Major E.D. Rash, 2/Lt. S.F.T.B. Lever with 5 A.10, 2 – 15cwt. trucks left camp to go ahead of main party and reconnoitre routes.

2

Bn. moved out of area 07.30 hours in march of 50 miles towards Bir Sheferzer. 3 maintenance casualties on way. “A” Echelon moved behind Bn. “B” Echelon; went by coast road.

3

March continued 07.30 hours for approx. 70 miles to Bir Sheferzen. Arrived 15.00 hours. Bn. leaguered by Sqns. “B” Echelon joined Bn. 18.30 hours. Major Rash and party at Bir Sheferzen before us. 1 “B” Sqn. lorry returned. Second one reported to have been taken in a mixed force of light tanks and carriers etc., to Benghazi. This lorry contained fitters and A.13 spares.

4

Day of maintenance. Orders for resumption of march given by B.M. at Brigade HQ, 16.30 hours.

5

Continued march for 60 miles to Bir El Gubi, through gaps in wire on Italian border. A.10s again started 1 hour before Bn. Warning order from B.M. that situation having changed, the advance would not continue on same lines and that to ease supply problem Brigade was moving to El Adem. Situation changed owing to 7^th Armd. Div. continuing advance rapidly and the impossibility of 5^th RTR catching up with enemy.

6

Bn. moved in quadruple line ahead to area 13 miles west of El Adem. Heavy sandstorm. Mileage approx. 40 miles. Left 13.00 hours, arrived 18.00 hours. Major M.D.B. Lister arrived with remnants and stragglers etc., at 19.00 hours.

7

Maintenance in leaguer area. Order from Brigadier personally for two recces of routes to Agedabia. Major E.D. Rash and 2/Lt. D.N. MacDonald ordered to go by separate routes. Orders attached.

8

Heavy rain in leaguer area. Major Rash and 2/Lt. MacDonald received final orders for recce and started off 12.00 hours.

9

Heavy rain in area. Maintenance continued. 

10

Brigadier gave orders to move on 11^th Feb. to drier area to avoid wet ground. Air Force liaison with recce parties cancelled owing to bad weather.

11

Bn. moved to new area 8 miles east after firing by Sqns. Major Rash returned from recce. 1 truck had run onto a Thermos bomb and been blown up. One man injured.

12

Arrangements for search for 2/Lt. MacDonald recce party made with Air Force. Orders for Major Rash to go on second recce. General maintenance and washing. Extra water available. 2/Lt. MacDonald and party returned 21.00 hours.

13

Brigadier TEWT for Captains and above on defences of Tobruk. Major Rash and Lieut. Erskine left on recce of southern route to Agedabia.

14-15

Maintenance continues. 

16

Major Rash and party returned from recce of southern route to Agedabia area. Major Dean, 6^th RTR gave lecture to officers of RHQ on the campaign in Western Desert until Bardia was taken.

17

Brigadier returned from Corps. HQ and gave verbal instructions about formation of a Brigade group including all Brigade services but without 5^th RTR. 5^th RTR to remain El Adem area until receiving orders to move back to Egypt. No information concerning formation to which 5^th RTR is to be attached. T/Capt. G.J. Gilpin relinquishes appointment of Adjutant wef 16^th Feb. 41. and is posted to “C” Sqn. A/Capt. F.W. Coombes assumes appointment of Adjutant wef 16^th February 41. Capt. E.R.S. Castle joined unit from HQ 3^rd Armd. Brigade posted to “A” Sqn. wef 17^th February 41. “A” Sqn. v. “B” Sqn. Tank v. Tank Exercise.

18

Brigadier visited RHQ to take leave of officers of 5^th RTR on departure for Beda Fomm area. “B” Sqn. v. “C” sqn. Tank v. Tank Exercise. 7 – A.13 Cruisers taken over from HQ 3^rd Armd. Brigade, 4 to HQ Sqn., 3 to “A” Sqn. 4 – A.13 tanks of HQ 2^nd Armd. Div. attached to unit for return to Egypt. Various tanks of 2^nd RTR attached to unit for return to Egypt.

19

Sqns. given warning order to be prepared to move by 22.00 hours 21^st February 41.

20

CO and Adjt. went to Sollum and Capuzzo area to inspect work being carried out. 2.A13, one “A” Sqn., one “B” Sqn. left there during the march up to El Adem area. Brigade HQ tank handed over in Sollum area, arrived in 5^th RTR leaguer, 18.00 hours. Lieut. K.D. Miller went to Sollum to take charge of the tanks there, but returned owing to the Brigade tank having left.

21

Capt. G.J. Gilpin posted from “C” sqn. to “A” Sqn.

22

6 RTR arrived Tobruk habour without vehicles or tanks and came under command of CO 5 RTR.

23

Advance party 6^th RTR arrived El Adem area. LO from Corps HQ to inform CO that the following units came under command of CO 5^th RTR:- 1 RHA, 6^th RTR, 1 Tower Hamlets (later cancelled). During their stay in El Adem area. Orders for grouping of all transport available foreshadowed.

24

6^th RTR moved into area assisted by 5^th RTR transport. Air Raids on Tobruk cause special orders for PAD precautions.

25

Message from Corps asking if unit able to move back to Mersa Matruh by road. Orders received for return to Egypt of 2^nd Div. HQ tanks previously attached to 5^th RTR. A recce party composed of Major T.K.D. Pritchett, Major G.F. Talbot and the Bn. IO Lieut. D.N. MacDonald left for a 6 day recce of the forward area, in two 15 cwt. Fordson trucks.

26

“C” Sqn. fired a Besa practice.

27

“B” Fired a Besa practice. A detachment from 901 Coy. RASC, 3 Armd. Brigade composed of 39 other ranks and 16 vehicles moved into area and came under command of CO 5^th RTR.

28

“A” Sqn. and RHQ Troops fired a Besa practice.

March 1941

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. H.D. Drew, O.B.E., M.C.

Place

Date

Hour

Summary of Events and Information

References to Appendices

El Adem

1-5

Individual and troop training.

6

Recce party to forward area returned.

7

Lecture by Major Gordon-Hall RTR, Ministry of supply on Tank Production.

Major Rash returned from ME Cairo after being consulted on Anti-Tank Questions. BTO, Capt. Southon, returned from Cairo after a visit to hasten supply of new engines.

10

0830; Bn. exercise in breaking leaguer, changing direction and a short tactical exercise.

16.00 Conference to discuss exercise.

12

1100

 Bn. at 1 hours notice to move, 

13

0200

Air Raid on El Adem aerodrome. 5 Scout Cars doing ground protection engaged enemy aircraft with LMG fire.

14

“A” Sqn. arrived area (S) Y 5756.

15

“A” Sqn. arrived Bir Bu Haragh (S) Y.36. 3 – A.13s had been left en route for recovery. “A” Sqn. arrived Antellat, carried out maintenance and sent for petrol.

16

1000

Strength 11 – A.13s and 2 - A.10s. GSO III from Cyrcom to obtain tank states, armament states, etc.

17

1630

“A” Sqn. arrived Saunnu

18

0900

CO, Lt/Col. H.D. Drew O.B.E., M.C., and Lieut. D.B. Erskine left on recce of forward area.

19

Recces continued. “A” Sqn. organisation:- Fit party of 7 – A.13s proceeded to Bushy Top Tree area. Unfit party 4 days maintenance before rejoining fit party. 2 – A.10s handed over to 6^th RTR under order from 3^rd Armd. Brigade. 3 of these A.13s had later to go to LRS owing to engine trouble and were not seen again with the unit.

20

0830

Major Talbot left Bn, to proceed to staff college. Party of 6 3-ton lorries and a guard left leaguer to form petrol dump on the projected route to forward area.

21

0930

Bn. left area to join 2 Armd. Div. in forward area. Route El Adem – Bir Harmat on trigh El Hacheim – a point 57 m. on bearing of 257 degrees approx. from crosstracks trighs Hacheim and El Abd-Bir Bu Haraga, on trigh El Abd – thence by a route to be given by CO 5^th RTR to forward area. Distance approx. 260 miles. Bn. organisation:- HQ Sqn. OC Major M.D.B. Lister, in absence of CO on recce. 4 – A.13s Cruisers. Command, Rear link, Navigator, Spare link. 2 – A.13s Cruisers spare. “A” Sqn. already in forward area.

“B” Sqn. Major E.R.S. Castle; 13 – A.13s Cruisers, 2 – A.10s Cruisers.

“C” Sqn. Major H.N. Winship; 14 – A.13s Cruisers, 1 – A.10 Cruiser.

14.00 hours. Reached leaguer area and petrol dump. Distance 84 miles.

Bir Bu Haraga

22

0800; March resumed, 15.30 arrived Bir Bu Haraga. Tanks showing signs of wear – 7 tanks arrived during evening after slight mechanical trouble, 4 tanks left for recovery.

23

Day of maintenance and collection of tanks only requiring unit fitters. 3 – tanks left for recovery. NB. No recovery unit accompanied 5^th RTR. Previous orders from 3^rd Armd. Brigade required any tanks for recovery to be left in situ to be recovered later. The main reasons for these tanks “packing up” were (1) excessive engine wear caused them to run very hot. (2) The air filters were not only placed in a bad position but were too easily choked up, again causing the engine to run very hot. (3) Vibration caused innumerable oil and water leaks and fractures.

El Hasseiat

24

0830

Bn. proceeded via Maaten El Grara – Giof El Matur to El Hasseiat.

25

0830

As Bn. was about to move, LO arrived with orders not to advance before tanks and “A” Echelon were complete with POL. “B” Echelon proceeded to Brigade “B” Echelon area – 3 m. north of Gtafia, as previously ordered and came under Brigade control. 

Forward Area

26

Bn. proceeded down Waddi Faregh to Bir Gefera (X) B.76 Country very bad, considerable trouble with overheating, due to heavy going, and with wheeled vehicles sticking in sand.

27

Bn. moved to Bushy Tree Top area (X) B. 87 where “A” Sqn. were situated and came again under the CO. All tanks were now in need of at least three days maintenance, a considerable number showing signs of heavy engine wear; the petrol, oil and water consumption in many cases was very excessive. 

28

CO at a Brigade conference received details of a plan of withdrawal, should withdrawal prove necessary. Tank strength of Bn.:- 28 – A.13 Cruisers (including “A” Sqn.). The A.10 Cruisers (close support) had been taken into LRS to be handed over to 6^th RTR under an order received by LO. 26.3.41. as these C.S. tanks were found to be unable to keep up with the A.13 Cruisers.

29

Recces carried out on withdrawal routes.

30

1000

Fit tanks of “A” Sqn. (6 – A.13s) went forward with KDG Armd. car patrol to area south of El Agheila, with object of supporting KDG patrols.

31

0630

“A” Sqn. encountered main force of enemy moving east. One tank of Sqn. hit and turret jammed, so withdrew from action. Remaining 3 tanks stayed in position of observation. Enemy casualties uncertain, probably about 3 M.13 tanks.

Bn. moved to line “Aaron” on orders from Brigade HQ and took up a defensive position during dark. Composition of Bn:- HQ Sqn. 4 tanks, “A”/”B” Sqn. 7 tanks. OC Major E.R.S. Castle.

“C” Sqn. 13 tanks. OC Major H.D. Winship.

AFVs 6 A13s of A Sqn 5 RTR

2 Armd cars of KDGs

MT I Fitter lorry of A Sqn 5 RTR

1 LAD vehicles of RAOC

1 Ambulance attached 3 Armd Bde.

RA 1 Bofors AA (did not reach assembly area owing to bad going)

Maaten Giofer road ((x) B.24)

-----------------------------------------------------------

30

0700

One A Sqn A13 returned to Bn leaguer with mechanical trouble.

0900

PritchForce assembled Bir es Suera ((x) B.5665)

1000

Attack by 2 Me 110s. 2 bombs dropped, some machine gunning. No casualties.

1030

AFVs moved out of assembly area, moving due west for approx 16 miles.

1900

one A13 returned to assembly area with mechanical trouble - no compression.

2100

Leaguered ((x) B.3357), 8 miles east of workmen’s huts on Agheila - Maaten Giofer road ((x) B.2054).

31

0400

Broke leaguer and moved west.

0630

KDGs reported small cluster of enemy vehicles 2 miles to SW ? ((x) B.2351).

0645

KDGs moved forward as ordered to right flank to draw enemy fire. A13s moved up for frontal attack at range of 800 yds. Exchange of fire for 20 mins, with enemy force apparently comprising 6 or 7 AFVs and one or more mortars firing HE. 1 A13 received hit on turret ring with AP shot, jamming turret. Crew received scratches.

KDGs in observation reported 4 direct hits on enemy vehs. Light throughout action very poor.

0705

Maj Pritchett ordered withdrawal to ridge in rear for observation. All enemy vehs except 2 seen to move off in Northerly direction.

0715

Major Pritchett gave orders to move east.

0800

Wireless report received from KDGs that 4 enemy AFVs and 2 MT were proceeding towards White Mosque ((x) B4475). Maj Pritchett ordered change of direction to contact this force.

1000

Arrived in observation position ((x) B.4371) overlooking White Mosque and coast road. Various small parties AFVs and MT seen moving east along road, followed later by larger column. In all about 40-50 AFVs, 20 MT and some infantry. Remained in observation, reporting back by wireless.

1030

Column seen to turn south towards our position moving down western edge of Marsh ((x) B.57). Maj Pritchett ordered withdrawal to Bir es Suera.

1045

KDG HQ reported 200 enemy AFVs from south (believed from Wadi el Faregh)

1050

1 Armd Car KDGs broke spring and propeller shaft. Kit and crew transferred to remaining car. Abandoned veh destroyed under enemy observation. Enemy took no notice.

1400

Arrived Bir es Suera. AFVs refuelled and force returned to Unit areas ;ess 3 A13s of A Sqn which were left in support of standing patrol of 6 RTR at Bir es Suera.

1500

3 A13s at Bir es Suera machine gunned by 2 Me 110s.

1700

A13s ordered from Bir es Suera to unit areas.

(Signed) H D Drew, LtCol; Comd 5 RTR.

April 1941

Commanding Officer: Lt Col H D Drew, OBE, MC

Place

Date

Hour

Summary of Events and Information

References to Appendices

Forward Area

1

0600

On orders received by unit LO during night, moved back along CL with 3 Hussars doing protection rear. Total strength with Bn was 19 tanks.

1200

Halted in defensive position 4 miles N of Gtafia astride Agedabia track.

1600

Withdrew to area Bir Tombia and took up defensive position astride track.

A13 Eggesford fell out and was destroyed.

2

0930

Code word ‘OXFORD’ received by unit LO. Bn continued withdrawal by slow stages, keeping south of general Bde Centre Line, each unit of this Bde finding its own rear protection.

1400

Orders by wireless from Bde to assist 3 H who were in contact with enemy to SW of Bn.

1410

Above order cancelled.

SE of AGEDABIA

1600

Petrol column under Capt Gilpin, with petrol from dump at Bir Belaudah, supplied Bn tanks 50 galls each, making three quarter fill.

1625

Order from Bde for CO to be on air in 15 mins. Bn halted to await orders. (NB the air was so full for the next hour that these orders were not received before enemy action caused continuance of withdrawal this was partly due to code words being used that were not on the code lists.)

(S) X.21

1715

C Sqn protection rear, reported large mass of tanks with crews on outside and vehicles 2-3 miles away. Reported to Bde.

1730

Warning from Bde that 6 RTR might be in position of these vehicles.

1732

Approaching tanks opened fire, with setting sun immediately behind them obscuring their position. C Sqn returned fire.

1745

CO 5 RTR ordered withdrawal behind next ridge. OC C Sqn acknowledged order.

1750

Bn reformed behind ridge approx 1 mile to North, but enemy did not follow up. Capt Gilpin’s petrol vehicle returned for casualties.

See Appx B and B(1)

Own Forces:- Five tanks lost, one damaged by 47 mm shell entering fighting compartment and preventing rotation.

1. Major Winship Tank set on fire, one man seen to evacuate.

2. Capt Clifford Tank thought to be set on fire, no news of crew.

3. Capt Erskine Last seen advancing towards enemy. No news of crew.

4. Lt Millar Tank set on fire. Crew all seen to evacuate.

5. Lt Ramsay. No information

6. Sgt Clarkson Tank damaged. Tpr Sims wounded and died after tank had withdrawn with Bn.

1800

A/B Sqns on order received just before enemy opened fire went to assist 3 H.  {See separate War Diaries at end of month]

1900

Bn continued march toward Antellat.

3

0200

Bn halted for sleep.

Composition of Bn:-

HQ 3 tanks

A/B Sqn 4 tanks, Major Castle

C Sqn 4 tanks, Major Gilpin.

One tp c Sqn, OC Lt P Steevens, attached to 1 RHA to protect during move, had left Bn 0800 hrs 2.4.41.

ANTELLAT

0530

Moved to Antellat. Orders received to protect flank of 1 RHA during withdrawal to Es Sceleidima.

Major Castle rejoined with A/B Sqn at Antellat, having been unable to find 3 H owing to darkness.

1230

Halted in area 6 m S of Es Sceleidima.

1300

Orders received by unit LO to destroy 8 enemy tanks approaching from Antellat and to reconnoitre lying up positions for night near Es Sceleidima. The 8 tanks were tanks of 6 RTR, some of which were not flying recognition flags.

1630

Orders received to form part of column to relieve Msus during night.

1900

Verbal orders from Bde Comdr to withdraw to Er Regima, giving protection rear to other units. Both these orders were cancelled in later orders.

1930

Verbal order from Bde Comdr to send a troop to assist 3 H who reported enemy AFVs approaching.

1935

3H report AFVs to be KDG armoured cars.

1935

Move to Er Regima delayed while search made for 1 RHA. Search continued through night.

4

0500

Verbal orders from Bde Comdr for attack on Msus held by enemy. Move to Er Regima cancelled.

0545

Two troops, one u/c Major Castle, one u/c Capt Gilpin, left to proceed to position 5 miles west of Msus while patrol KDG report on Msus. 1 A13 fell out after 13 miles with engine trouble. On orders from Bde this was stripped but not destroyed.

0800

5 tanks under Capt Gilpin in position as ordered.

1000

KDG report Msus unoccupied. Bn give local protection as Bde and attached troops pass through Msus. Some petrol and a quantity of rations obtained from dump.

1500

Orders by LO to move independently for 15 miles on bearing of 340°. Order repeated verbally to CO.

1800

Bn leaguered for night.

5

1000

Orders received by unit LO to move to position in area (S) N.88.

1300

Reached area. One tp under Capt Gilpin acting on verbal instructions from Bde Comd investigated report of enemy arm’d cars in vicinity, but none encountered. Position giving protection S and W of Bde area taken up for night.

Track El ABIAR

6

0230

Petrol vehicle u/c Maj Castle refuelled Bn.

0700

one tp of 2 tks opened fire on 2 vehs at extreme range. Vehicles withdrew. These vehicles were part of 6 RTR who had reported moving E from Msus to Mechili.

1130

After waiting for one sqn 6 RTR which was expected to pass through, Bn withdrew down track towards position 10 miles away S S9581. (This Sqn 6 RTR had turned E on night of 5th Apr and was nowhere in our vicinity note by CO)

1230

Wireless message from Bde ordering conc in Bde area 15 m S of Tecnis (s) N.9488.

1400

Verbal orders from 2i/c Bde to dispose Bn on left flank of 3 H to repel and destroy a column seen moving N to present Bde posn on track Msus-Tecnis (S) N.9488.

1515

This column turned out to be the officer sent for A Ech returning along a very dusty track, A Ech having been previously withdrawn.

MECHILI

1530

Bn moved towards Tecnis, as rearguard to Bde.

One tank having run over 8 Thermos bombs and damaged tracks, gear boxes and bogeys was abandoned and stripped.

MARANA

1630

Orders to move to Maraua (S) O.11.

2230

Arrived Maraua. Orders from major Layzelles, RC of S, 3rd Armd Bde to move to 6 m east of Derna forthwith. CO who had gone ahead to find a petrol dump met unit 2 miles from Maraua and a complete refill was effected for the Bn. 

Tank State:-

1. rear link L5242 (former C Sqn)

2. Troop 3 tanks 15252, 15253, 15242 (C Sqn) Capt Gilpin

3. Troop 2 tanks 9183 Exponent (B Sqn) 2/Lt Chave

7

1100

Halted to W of Derna Pass for maintenance.

1145

Proceeded down pass. Slight MG attack by EA at bottom of pass, while allowing units of SG to pass through.

1200

Information received by CO that vehicles ahead of column had been attacked by enemy force on aerodrome east of Derna. Remaining tanks ordered to proceed to top of hill as quickly as possible. T 15252 had been using 5 galls of oil for every 10-15 miles and was unable to climb pass. T 15251, also owing to engine trouble, was unable to climb hill and shed a track on a bad corner, partially blocking the road. Both tanks stripped and abandoned.

DERNA

1300

CO reconnoitred enemy position in staff car. Enemy MG fire destroyed car. 4 remaining tanks under command Capt Gilpin took up hull down position and fired on enemy at medium range, having previously refuelled. This position was in support of one platoon THR and 2 A/Tk guns and 1 Coy KRRC. Some enemy casualties caused.

1730

Tanks advanced on enemy position while remainder of column drove round between the enemy position and the sea, and thence to the main road behind the enemy

1915

Column proceeded toward Tobruk. In this action the 4 remaining tanks were lost from effects of enemy fire. Approx 13 enemy Armd Cars and some guns knocked out.

Own Casualties: two ORs killed

2/Lt Chave, I OR wounded.

TOBRUK

8

0215

Column reached Tobruk

1200

Reinforcements from RAC joined unit, 11 officers and 37 ORs. CO appointed to temporary comd 3rd Armd Bde. 

Bn formed into following units:-

Tank Sqn, Sqn HQ and 3 troops each of 3 A13s.

14

2130

The remainder of the unit, with the exception of certain fitters, Tech Storemen, etc, attached to RAOC Tobruk, sailed to Alexandria to refit.

18

Disposition of Bn: Off ORs

Abbassia 17 199

ALEX

17

Train from quayside Alexandria dep 1330 hrs, arrived Abbassia Siding 2000 hrs. Met by transport, moved to RAC Base Depot, Abbassia.

Bn Strength:-

17 officers, 157 ORs.

BASE

18

Clothing parade.

Undermentioned officers provisionally appointed to ranks shown wef today’s date:-

T/Capt Jackson to A/Major J C Jackson

T/Capt L Sherley price to A/Major

Lt D N Macdonald to A/Capt

T/Capt Gilpin to A/Major

Lt R J A Hinton to A/Capt

Lt P Steevens to A/Capt

Lt S J Hennings to A/Capt

2/lt J D Stoward to A/Capt

19

Clothing and RSM’s parade

20

Memorial service for late Capt G F Bond

21

Major M D B Lister assumes comd of unit wef 8.4.41

22-23

D&M Courses provided by RAC School. Sqn training.

24

2/Lt Rodger left for Haifa in charge of men from 6 Bn RTR to deliver vehicles.

26

Cpl Spence and 5 men rejoin Bn. This party had to abandon vehicles in Derna on 7.4.41 and scatter on approach of enemy. They met Lt Boland LC of Sgs and came under his command, walking by night and hiding by day and reached Tobruk on 19.4.41. rejoined Bn 26.4.41.

27

Capt Kelsey Bn MO rejoined unit. He stayed behind at Derna with a wounded man. Walked alone from Derna to Tobruk. Sailed 23rd, rejoined 27th.

Voluntary church service.

28

2/Lt Rodger returned from Haifa.

29

Training. 2/Lt Gregor and 22 ORs to Alexandria to pick up vehicles.

30

Training, etc.

A.13s

5 Never started from Tobruk being in workshops there.

2 were recovered, (to Beida Fomm) after our approach march from El Adem, but were not received again by the Battalion.

10 were awaiting recovery on line of march from El Adem forward, but were not recovered.

5 were sent to LRS at Beda Fomm before the withdrawal from Bushy Top Tree and arrived there.

4 were destroyed on receipt of the code word “Laxative” or shortly afterwards (they had been awaiting recovery)

8 were sent towards LRS during the withdrawal – most of these did not arrive.

6 were stripped or destroyed by unit as a result of complete engine failure.

1 was wrecked by running on thermos bombs.

1 was destroyed to clear the road at Barce.

2 were abandoned in Derna being unable to climb the pass before it was blown.

9 were lost in action.

2 returned to Tobruk.

A.10s

1 was in Tobruk workshops before advance started.

4 were handed over (temporarily immobilised) to 6 Bn. at Beida Fomm.

1 was destroyed during withdrawal on order from OME.

               It is impossible to get an accurate or complete description of the events of 3rd April, as at present none of the Tank Comds or gunners of the surviving tanks is here; this a resume of what happened based in certain Driver’s stores. (Note 1).

               On 2nd April the Bn was withdrawing from an area 3 miles North of Ft Gtafia to a posn on the track Aghedabia - Saunnu, in accordance with a plan put in force on receipt of a code-word OXFORD, which had been given to us at 0900 hrs that morning. By this plan, at about 1000 hrs, 3rd Armd Bde were to withdraw to a line N of Aghedabia, with the 3rd Hussars on the right (facing the enemy), of the 5 RTR. 3 H had attached to them one squadron of 6 RTR with M.13 tanks.

               The timing of our withdrawal was regulated by the speed of A/E Bty RHA for whose protection in the withdrawal we were responsible. Their speed was about 7 mph, compared to our 15 mph.

               The strength and disposition of the Bn during this move was as follows:- C Sqn less one tp (9 tanks) under Major Winship was giving protection rear the RHQ (4 tanks) and a combined A/E Sqn (6 tanks) under Major E R S Castle. One tp C Sqn (3 tanks) under Lt Steevens was giving close support to A/E Bty 1 RHA. (Note II)

               At about 1300 hrs the Bn halted for an hour to allow the RHA part of whom we had passed, to get ahead of us. At 1245 hrs Sgt Clarkson of “Edgeworth” (no 11 Tp) and his driver saw 40 or 50 vehicles covering a 2 mile front through his glasses. They were about 3 or 4 miles away, and were following up our centre line. At the same time a Major in the RHA came up to see Sgt Rightford of “Edgehill” (No 11 Tp) and asked him what he made of a cloud of dust behind. Sgt Rightford directed this Major to LtCol Drew, OBE, MC (CO 5 RTR) who was nearby. (Note III)

At about 1300 the withdrawal was resumed before this cloud of dust was close enough to be properly identified. In the next two hours there were two major delays - one being mechanical and the other due to an order being given by Bde and then countermanded.

               At approx 1625 hrs, the Bn met two of its petrol lorries; it halted just as it was and the petrol lorries went round tot he tanks refuelling them. Outside fuel tanks were filled by certain drivers, though in most cases unsatisfactory running had caused their use to be discontinued. (Note IV)

At that time 3 Armd Bde called commanders to be on the air to receive orders. Sqn comdrs assembled with the CO by the rear link tank to receive orders. Owing to excessive talk on the air, the passing of these orders took over ¾hrs, and were to the effect that Support Gp had encountered enemy tanks; that 5 RTR were to send a troop to assist them and that contact with Sp Gp was to be made through 3 Hussars. Att his time, and while refuelling was in progress, “Edgehill” (No 10 Tp) reported to Lt Ramsey the Tp Ldr “30 - 40 vehicles are approaching from the South-West”. (Note V).

               Lt Ramsey wirelessed to Major Winship’s tank asking “Have you heard that message?” it was taken over to Major Winship standing by the CO’s tank. Major Winship informed the CO and had a reply sent “Keep an eye on them and report anything further as regards their identification.” Major Winship then went over to his own tank and immediately himself wirelessed Lt Ramsey “Have you anything further to report about those vehicles?” Lt Ramsey asked Sgt Rightford who replied that he was still unable to distinguish them. The vehicles concerned were then between 3 and 4 miles away.

               Major Winship then ordered “10 and 11 Tps will take up a hull-down position on the ridge to the rear and do protection to the Battalion. I will come up as soon as I can to see the situation for myself.” As our tanks started to move, the enemy tanks stopped behind a small ridge. They were some 5000 yds away. Our own tanks got into hull-down positions on two shoulders of a ridge as under:- 

               By the time our tanks had reached this position the enemy had left behind some vehicles which appeared to be lorries and had pushed further forward a column of about 60 vehicles. There was further talk on the air about the identity of this column and the fact was then brought out that their crews appeared to be riding on the outside and that they carried no flags. Lt Ramsey said “They must be enemy because they have wireless masts on the side.” The presence of these vehicles was reported to Bn HQ and by them to Bde. Bde reported “Be careful, they are not the 6th Bn who may be on your front.” This was passed to Major Winship and passed on by him to his Sqn. (Note VI).

It should now be pointed out again that one Sqn of 6 RTR were isolated, doing protection rear to 3 Hussars, and that previously tanks of 6 RTR had passed through us. Again we had no contact with, or information about, the enemy on our front that day. The enemy force advancing where their lorries had been left, split when about 3000 yds from our tanks. 30-40 vehicles came straight for us in arrowhead formation and a separate column broke away to our right.

               When the enemy were 2000 yds away, Major Winship gave the order “Stand by to open fire at 800 yds.” Information that Major Winship had given a preparatory was passed to the CO who ordered a message to be sent to Major Winship that they must make certain they were not 6th Bn. (Note VII). Major Winship passed this on again to his troop leaders, but no sooner had he done so than heavy fire was opened on us by 47 mm and either mortar or light artillery. Major Winship sent a message to the Bn “They must be enemy as they have opened fire on us.””

Within the first minute Lt Millar’s tank, Endeavour, had been hit on the auxiliary petrol tank and set on fire. Lt Millar and his complete crew baled out and running to the right rear of the left hand tank of his troop took cover. They have not been seen since. The line held by 10 and 11 Tps was now reinforced by 2 RHQ tanks. In spite of the fact that we were firing directly into the sun we returned their fire effectively. The ranges given by tank commanders in their orders varied from 900 to 1500 yds, and at least 8 enemy tanks are claimed to have been put out of action by our surviving gunners. (Note VIII).

              Owing to the intensity of the enemy fire, and our bad position relatively to the setting sun - and as several of our leading tanks were seen to be burning, Col Drew decided to withdraw. He sent a message “Sura” (C Sqn) is to withdraw and conform to my movements. Ibun (A Sqn) will give protection until this move is completed.”

               Major Winship was heard to acknowledge and say “Yes, it is getting rather hot.” He then ordered his Tp to withdraw.

Details of the individual tanks most prominently engaged are as follows:-

Of the tanks of 10 Tp:

              Edgeworth fired 15 rounds and claims two hits of these. One hit was most definitely seen on an enemy tank the crew of which bale out. In his excitement the gunner put another 2-pdr shell into the crew as they were getting away which caused them to disappear.

              Edgehill’s gun went out of action after 5 rounds. They twice sent a message to Lt Ramsey asking to withdraw to get it put right; they could not get a reply but Major Winship took up the call and said “OK, 10A withdraw.”

               Earlier in this fight Emu (Lt Ramsay) was hit early in the action and was seen to be in flames.

               There were no known survivors of the tanks of 11 Tp. The part of the action taken by Enterprise (Cpl Green) cannot be gauged as none of the crew are yet back in Tobruk.

               The action of Endeavour (Lt Millar) has been described.

Encourage (Sgt Knight) received a 47 mm shell under the running board as it was withdrawing from the action; this severely wounded Tpr Simms who died shortly afterwards.

               Of the HQ tanks of C Sqn:-

               Earn (Major Winship) was hit as it was turning to come out of action and was set on fire; one man is said to have got out, who is believed to have been L/Cpl Bartholomew, the wireless operator, but there is no evidence as where he went to.

               Esk (Capt Clifford) was also seen on fire, while none was seen to leave his tank.

               As for             (Capt Erskine), he is reported to have last been seen waving the flag signal for the advance and moving up towards the enemy.

The tanks of AB Sqn holding a rear position did not properly come into action, though they appear to have fired some few rounds.

The withdrawal was successfully covered by AB Sqns, and the Bn rallied in a line 2 miles behind that on which the action had taken place. The action was reported to 3 Armd Bde and the casualties evacuated from the tanks.

No attempt to follow us up was made by the enemy.

Our withdrawal according to our original plan was then continued.

               In the five tanks that had been put out of action we lost:

                              Major Winship

                              Capt Clifford

                              Capt Erskine

                              Lt Ramsey

                              Lt Millar and 18 ORs.

               There was one additional casualty in a tank that came out of action.

(Signed) M D B Lister, Major, for LtCol Comd 5 R Tanks.

Notes on report of Action on 2nd April 1941 SE of Aghedabia.

Note I.

          The action took place on 2nd April not 3rd April 1941.

Note II.

          The strength and disposition of the tanks in the Bn at the commencement of the day was as under:-

C Sqn            12 tanks

RHQ Sqn       4 tanks

AB Sqns         6 tanks.

          At the time of the action the Bn had been still further depleted by 2 mechanical casualties to tanks of AB Sqns ad by one Tp C Sqn (Lt Steevens) which had been detached for protective duties with 1 RHA.

          At the time of the action the total strength of the Bn was, therefore, 17 tanks.

Note III.

          This paragraph is extremely misleading. It gives the impression that this was the first occasion on which enemy vehicles were sighted. In fact they were not enemy but were the 1 RHA and there was never any question of doubt about this.

          The Bn halted in a protection rear position for about an hour to permit 1 RHA to get clear.

Note IV.

          It is extremely difficult to give accurate timings throughout the day, but I consider that generally speaking, the timings given are too early. The withdrawal from Bir et Tombia did not start until 1130 hrs.

          During the withdrawal there were three major halts:

(I) that referred to in note three;

(2) the halt of about 1½ hrs owing to mechanical trouble with Capt Sherley-Price’s tank and to Lt Stoward’s tank;

(3) a further halt of about an hour owing to mechanical trouble with Lt Stoward’s tank.

          At the time of the action in the evening, the sun was very low, and by the time the withdrawal had been completed and surviving tanks rallied it was almost dark. It was quite dark by the time A Echelon transport, under Capt Southon, had been collected, as a result my estimate of the times of incidents of the evening are as follows:-

Note V.

            The account of the messages and R/T conversations which took place is rather misleading as regards the picture that was presented at RHQ at the time.

            At 1730 hrs the CO and Sqn Comdrs were at  the Rear link tank standing by to receive important orders from 3 Arm’d Bde.

            At about 1745 hrs a runner came over from the CO’s tank with C Sqn’s first report which was to the effect that there were 15 to 25 unidentified vehicles 3 or 4 miles away, but it was thought that some of them were tanks.

            The CO then ordered the OC C Sqn to return to his Sqn, which was doing “Protection Rear”, and to keep the column under observation and to report further.

            The second report, about 20 mins later, estimated the number of vehicles at about 40 and to be a mixture of tanks and transport. At this time, crews were reported to be riding outside the tanks.

            This report was repeated to Bde who gave orders to be careful before opening fire, as it might be 6th Bn.

            This order was repeated to C Sqn and not at any other time as stated.

            A third report came at 1830 hrs. Sgt Lyons ran over from the CO’s tank and reported that Major Winship had given a fire order. The CO at once ordered all crews to mount and to move forward in support of C Sqn. No order was sent to C Sqn at this time not to fire, as almost immediately Sgt Lyons had delivered his message, enemy shells started falling long before any of the crews had time to mount their tanks.

            Of the remaining messages and conversations which are here recorded none were received at RHQ at the time but were collated during the subsequent inquiry.

Note VI.

            None of the information contained in these 2 paragraphs concerning the movements of the enemy was reported to RHQ at the time.

Note VII.

            This order was not sent by the CO.

            As stated in Note V crews of RHQ and AB Sqns were ordered to mount and move forward into action in support of C Sqn, and enemy shells started falling long before any of the crews had time to mount their tanks.

Note VIII.

            The surviving tanks of the Bn were rallied by about 1900 hrs about 2000 yds N of the scene of the action. Four tanks AB Sqns (Major Castle) were then sent off to gain contact with 3 Hussars as previously ordered.

            The remainder of the Bn moved back about another mile and waited about ¾ hr whilst a Echelon transport was collected.

            At about 2000 hrs the remainder of Bn resumed the withdrawal to Antellat.

Note IX  (at end)

The enemy force was eventually established to be between 50 - 60 tanks of Mk II and III and IV pattern, supported by a Battery of 8 x 47 mm A/Tk guns. From a diary captured from a dead German soldier of this same unit, on 14 Apr at Tobruk, it was established that this was a Bn of 5 Tank Regt. A noteworthy co-incidence. The same diary had an entry dated 3 April worded as follows:-

“Yesterday we had a terrifying experience in action against British tanks near Aghedabia. Our casualties were considerable although, thank God,  I survived unhurt. After this I will give up drinking, smoking, and sexual intercourse for the rest of the war.”

War Diary A Squadron 3 Hussars/5 R Tanks. 8 April - 5 May 1941

April 8

A Sqn 3H/5 RTR formed.

Composition:-

Major E R S Castel - OC

Lt Steevens No 1 Troop

Lt Hennings No 2 Troop

2/Lt Moss No 3 Troop

Total - 4 officers, 58 ORs.

9

OC reported to CO 3 Hussars. All tanks at present in AOW Tobruk, 15 Lights and cruisers should be available pm tomorrow.

10

Sqn moved in Wadi M/Ref 412428. Personnel re-equipped as far as possible.

Pm. Two A13s drawn from AOW. Divisional A13 arrives. These after refilling and rationing are despatched to join 3 Hussars M/Ref 410429 under Lt Steevens.

11

One A13 from AOW. Two more to be available am tomorrow.

12

Three A13s now available to join 3 Hussars. These are despatched under Lt Hennings to join 3 Hussars.

13

One A13 from AOW. Squadron of two troops of three and HQ one A13 formed under Major Castle.

14

Information received enemy tanks have broken outer defences. 3H/5RTR move to area 404428. Considerable air activity, but no sign of enemy in this sector. Appear they may have turned east. Message received enemy tanks now retreating through wire SE of perimeter. Return to leaguer.

15

2/Lt Moss with two A13s from AOW joins Sqn.

16-18

Sqn at short notice to move but no incident to record.

19

Orders removed to proceed to area 399429 less B vehicles. No indication of task. Sqn moves. Some spasmodic shelling. Squadron halted but situation not clear as CO 3H cannot be found. Message received “Task should be easy as enemy AFVs consist mainly of M13s”. Still no indication of task. CO arrives, it appears we are to deal with enemy AFVs at 396429, whilst infantry deal with force at 397429. Spasmodic shelling, no casualties. Order received, operation cancelled. Return to leaguer.

20

No incident. Sqn at short notice to move.

21

Order received to hand over all tanks to 1 RTR. No incident.

22

Tanks handed over to 1 RTR. Drivers to remain a few days with tanks.

Pm. Orders received to take back all tanks from 1 RTR. This order was later cancelled.

23

Sqn less drivers and fitters on loan to 1RTR join B Echelon 1 RTR.

25

1 RTR B Echelon with personnel 5 RTR move to area 402436.

26/4 - 1/5

No incident, personnel employed belt-filling and digging.

2 May

Personnel on loan to 1 RTR rejoin Sqn, also Capt Southon with 26 ORs from AOD and AOW move to Wadi 412433.

Orders received to embark personnel on HM Ship am 3/5/41.

3

No embarkation, non-arrival of H M Ship

4

Personnel strength: 5 officers, 15 ORs embark on HMS Decoy.

5

Arrive Alexandria.

War Diary of No 1 MI  Coy, 5 RTR. 8 April - 5 May 1941.

No 1 MI Coy formed.

Composition:

            OC  -  Capt L Sherley-Price

            Pl Comdrs:       No 1 Pl 2/Lt R T Chesterfield

                                    No 2 Pl 2/Lt R G Goodyear

No 3 Pl 2/Lt P J Wilding

No 1 Pl formed from B Sqn personnel

No 2 Pl formed by A Sqn personnel

No 3 Pl formed by RHQ and A Sqn personnel.

Transport:        HQ  -  2 30-cwt lorries

                        No 1 Pl  -  4 15-cwts

                        No 2 Pl  - 2 30 cwts

                        No 3 Pl  -  4 15-cwts.

(Signed)  Sherley-Price, Coy Comdr

War Diary of No 2 MI Coy  8 April to 5 May 1941

8

No 2 MI Coy formed

Composition:- Capt G J Gilpin - OC

                  Pl Cmdrs - No1 - 2/Lt D J Browne

                                    No 2 - 2/Lt Lyon-Williams

                                    No 3 - 2/Lt J H Hawgood.

Personnel were equipped with rifles, Bren guns and Boyes rifles. The Coy was organised into 3 Plts of 4 sections each - 2 Bren sections, 1 Bren and Boyes sect, and one Boyes rifle section.

9

Tried to re-equip personnel who are very short of personal kit and to make up weapons with spares etc. This was prevented by orders to move.

10

OC received orders to report to 18th Australian Inf Bde. Took some to find HQ. Ordered to report to 10 Bn.

Moved into Wadi Marsa el-Auda 410438. Two Tprs found to be missing believed left at 18 Bde HQ as they dismounted from vehicles without orders.

12; 

Orders received to be prepared to move with 10 Bn who were moving up to Assembly area. OC Bty saw OC 10 Bn who said orders were issued in error, Coy to remain in wadi at 1 hour’s notice.. during morning drew up ammo scale and issued same. 

13

OC Coy received orders to report to 18 Bde HQ. Decided that Coy be used for defensive purpose only.

14; 

Warned to stand by as enemy were attacking. Men are much happier now they know exactly what is happening.

15; 

Australian instructors join Coy to instruct on Bren and Boyes rifles in defence. 

Almost complete equipment.

Received warning of possible approach of enemy patrols. Sentries doubled, no incidents.

16

Instruction continued. Instructors satisfied with standard of Boyes and Bren training of personnel.

17

NTR

18; 

received orders to report to 20 Bde HQ. Told to report to 15 Bn. 

19; 

Arrived at new position. Lt Whalley of AIF, 15 Bn, 20 Bde attached to Coy as adviser. Dug into new positions by dark. On instructions of OC 15 Bn, Coy was re-organised into 3 Plts of 3 Sects each, instead of 4.

20; 

Stood to.

Orders received that Bn move to new position at 0900 hrs, to be completed by 1000 hrs on 21 Apr.

21; 

Moved into new position 409428.

22

Moved into forward position to release “D” Coy 15 Bn who moved up to reinforce 13 Bn.

23; 

Conference at 15 Bn HQ on move to replace 17 Bn on perimeter. 

24; 

Moved back to reserve position. No 2 and 3 Plts to remain in forward area. No 1 Plt and CHQ on reserve to cover Bn HQ.

25

Given 100 mm (Italian) gun and two VMGs to man.

26

Bad dust storm most unpleasant. VMGs placed in position, but cannot use them as there are no spare parts boxes. 

27

Received warning order from 3 Armd Bde that evacuation of Coy was to take place.

28

Received orders to report to ESO at 0900 hrs 29 Apr 41.

Ordered to stand to.

29 

Ordered to stand down.

1700

Air raid. Ship sunk, fortunately no casualties.

30; 1130

OC Coy saw OC 3 Armd Bde and told to report to ESO. ESO gave details of move of personnel to TCHs. Baggage to load at once.

TCHs left Tobruk.

1 May

At Sea. Several men sea-sick, no incident.

2

Arrived outside Alexandria

Alexandria. Moved into harbour and berthed. Men taken by Tpt to Leave and Transit Camp, Mustapha.

3-4

Refitted men

5

Men proceeded on 5 days leave.

(Signed) G J Gilpin, Maj.

May 1941

Commanding Officer: Lt Col H D Drew, OBE, MC

CAIRO

1

Squadron training, D. & M. courses. Bn. strength – 21 Officers and 191 Other Ranks.

2

On receipt of order No. Q (M) 3/112/21. The unit moves from RAC Base Depot to Sidi Bishr Camp, Alexandria. Departure Cairo Main Station 

3

Unit personnel previously acting as Infantry at Tobruk rejoined unit – 17 Officers, 179 Other Ranks.

4

Voluntary Church Service.

5

4 Officers and 58 Other Ranks rejoin from Tobruk where they had been serving as 3 H/5 RTR Tank Squadron.

6-7

Courses and working parties. Bn. Strength 33 Officers, 517 Other Ranks.

8

Courses and working parties. Officers’ class to Ordnance Mex – Inspection of “I” tanks and partially assembled engines etc.

9-10

Courses and working parties.

11

Voluntary church service.

12

Tank and wireless courses. Working parties to Ordnance Mex. Lt. G.J. Callan and Lt. W.E.F. Winney posted and joined this unit. Lt. Callan to “C” Sqn. and Lt. Winney to HQ Sqn.

13

Courses and working parties. 2/Lt. C. Vanes and 2/Lt. A. Adams posted and joined this unit from RAC base depot. – 2/Lt. Vanes to “B” Sqn. and 2/Lt. Adams to HQ Sqn.

14

Courses and working parties. Bn. strength. 37 Officers and 504 Other Ranks.

15

Courses and working parties. Unit Quarterly Audit Board sits: President:- Major G.J. Gilpin. Members:- Major L. Sherley-Price, Major J.C. Jackson.

16

Courses and working parties Capt. R.J. Hinton admitted to hospital and posted to X (III) list and struck off strength.

17

Capt. Ward, Lt. Doyle and 2/Lt. Pinell and 31 ORs posted to this unit from 3^rd Armd. Brigade.

18

Voluntary Church Service. 2/Lt. B. E. Stone admitted to hospital and posted to X (II) list, and struck off strength.

19

Courses and working parties. 1 Officer and 12 Other Ranks Guard Duty on tanks at Seagull Camp.

20)

25

Voluntary Church Service.

26)

30

Courses and squadron training. Parties to Alexandria receiving “Sea Deep” personnel.

Reconnaissance of part of Delta Area made by Commanding Officer.

31

Courses and squadron training. Parties to Alexandria receiving “Sea Deep” personnel. Bn. Strength – 39 Officers, 564 Other Ranks.

June 1941

Commanding Officer: Lt Col H D Drew, OBE, MC

 SIDI BISHR.

1

Voluntary Church Service.   Sea Deep Parties.  23 ORs from 44^th Bn. RTR transferred and taken on strength of this unit.   Bn. strength – 37 Officers & 531 ORs.

2

Sqn. training and courses.   Sea Deep duties finish.   “X” Sqn. composed of remaining personnel of 8^th, 42^nd, and 44^th Bns. RTR established.   Helping with maintenance of instructional tanks.    Reconnaissance of delta area by CO and Col. Harcourt.     First of new “A” equipment received.    Two Cruisers A 9.    Two “I” Tanks Mark IIA.   Two light tanks Mark VIs.

3

Sqn. training and courses.   Unit under command of Desforce wef. today.

4

Sqn. training and courses.   Lecture at Mustapha for all Officers on “Parachutists.   Civilian problems, etc.”

5

Sqn. training and courses.   CO proceeds to Cairo.  Returns same evening.   Tank state unchanged.  

6

Sqn. training and courses.   CO, Col. Harcourt and Col. Ricketts make a reconnaissance of area north of camp.

Tank state:-   2 – Cruisers A.9.

                      2 – “I” Tanks Mark IIA.

                      2 – Light Tanks Mark VIB

                      8 – Troop Carriers.

Tank park established in grove half a mile east of camp.

7

Sqn. training “A” Sqn. being equipped first.  Lt. Col. H.D. Drew, O.B.E., M.C., returns from Tobruk.

Internal security Sqn. turn out with our own vehicles.  Inspected by Major M.D.B. Lister.   Bn. Strength:- 38 Officers & 556 Other Ranks.

Tank state:-  2 Cruisers A.9.

                     5 “I” Tanks Mark IIA

                     3 Light Tanks Mark VIB

                     8 Troop carriers.

8

Voluntary Church Service.   Tank kits etc., being drawn.

9

Col. Drew and Adjt. on leave.   New inlying picquet found for defence of camp area.  Camp divided into three zones.    Duty Sqn. excepted, each Sqn. mans one zone.    1 Officer, 1 N.C.O. and 9 ORs per Sqn.

Tank state:-   2 Cruisers  A.9.

                      10 “I” Tanks.  Mark IIA

                        4 “I” Tank Mark IIA star.

                        4 Light Tanks Mark VIB

                        8 Troop carriers.

10

Equipping of tanks.   2/Lt. C.T. Gregor and 1 N.C.O. to Abbassia on 17 days Chemical Warfare Course.

50% only of personnel to leave camp.

All ranks to be back in camp by 22.00 hours.

Tank state no change.

11

Equipping of tanks.   Tank state:-

2 Cruisers A.9.

12 “I” Tanks Mark IIA.

 6 “I” Tanks Mark IIA star.

 4 Light Tanks Mark VIB.

 1 Light Tank Mark VIC.

 1 Armoured Car.R.R.

 8 Troop Carriers.

12

Equipping of tanks & training.   No change in tank state.  Col. Drew and Adjt. return from leave.

13

Lt. Col. H.D. Drew, O.B.E., M.C., resumes command of unit.    “A” Sqn. receiving priority in equipment.

Tank state:-

2 Cruisers  A.9.

18 “I” Tanks Mark IIA

 9 “I” Tanks Mark IIA star.

 4 Light Tanks Mark VIB

 1 Light Tank Mark VIC

 1 Armoured Car  R.R.

 8 Troop Carriers.

News received that Capt. MM Clifford, Capt. D.I.B. Erskine and Lt. K.D. Millar are P.O.W.  Bn. strength:- 38 Officers & 548 ORs.

15

Voluntary Church Services.

On movement control No. 491/29A”A Sqn. detailed to move 12.00 hours. 16^th June, 41.   7 Officers, 83 ORs., 16 “I” Tanks and 2 Cruisers, 1 Light Tank Mark VIB and 2 Carriers.  OC Sq. Capt. D.W. MacDonald;  Major L. Sherley-Price sick.

Tank state:-

Cruisers A.9.  2

“I” Tanks Mark IIA – 24.

“I” Tanks Mark IIA star – 9.

Light tanks Mark VIB  - 4.

Light tanks Mark VIC  - 1.

Armoured Car R.R.  – 1.

Troop Carriers.   – 8.

16

“A” Sqn. entrains from Sidi Bishr.   Train leaves 12.00 hours.   Transport by road.  

HQ and “B” Sqn. preparation of tanks and vehicles.

17

“A” Sqn. arrive Mersa Matruh 06.30 hours.   Tanks unloaded.   Camouflage completed.   Move into leaguer area north east of Charing Cross.

18

HQ and “B” Sqns. on order No. 491/30 detailed to move forward on 19^th June, 41.   CO leaves for Mersa Matruh.

19

HQ and “B” Sqns. commence loading.   Completed 11.30 hours.   Train leaves 12.00 hours.    Transport leaves 10.00 hours.   Camps for night 7 miles west of El Daba.    One “I” tank Mark IIA star left at Workshops Mex.

CHARING CROSS.

20

 HQ and “B” Sqns. tanks arrive Mersa Matruh at 07.00 hours.   Met by CO.   Detrain  and complete camouflage.    Tanks leave by tps. as camouflaged for leaguer area.   Transport into leaguer area 11.00 hours.

12.00 hours.   2 i.c. Major M.D.B. Lister leaves to take command of 2^nd Bn. RTR.   2/Lt. B.E. Stone rejoins unit after completing liaison duties with Brigade.

21

“A” Sqn. test guns and proceed by tps. to point 3 miles south of Leaguer area for battle practice under CO.

22

HQ and “B” sqn. tanks test guns.   Battle practice under CO.   Major R.D.W. Uniacke joins unit.   Proceeds to Cairo on leave.

23

OC reconnoitres area for sqn. scheme.   Order No. AQ55 Des. Force received, warning unit that the 44^th Bn. RTR are taking over complete and that this unit will return to Mena on a date to be notified later.   Small advance party from 44^th RTR arrives.   Two “I” tanks Mark IIA to Ordnance with clutch trouble.

24

Maintenance on tanks and “B” vehicles.   Further small party from 44^th RTR arrives.    One “I” tank Mark IIA to Ordnance.   Engine trouble.

25

Brigadier Watkins, 1^st Army Tank Brigade and Lt. Col. Yeo, O.C. 44^th RTR arrive.   Details of hand over discussed.   Tentative date of 27 June, 41 agreed on for hand over.

26

Main body of 44^th Bn. RTR arrives 18.00 hours.

27

Checking and laying out of kit preparatory to hand over.  Hand over commences 14.00 hours, completed by 17.30 hours.  Lt. A.C. Doyle, Lt. Winney, and Party leave for Mena.    Contact Major R.D.W. Uniacke and decide on campsite.   2/Lt. P.W. Durham rejoins unit on completion of liaison duties with Brigade.

28

On Order No. MD/346 Des. Force, unit entrains from Mersa Matruh at 19.30 hours for Beni Yusef.   CO leaves by road.  10.00 hours.   Capt. S.J. Hennings and 2/Lt. B.E. Stone remain with 44^th RTR in advisory capacity.   QM Lt. A.L. Bevan remains completing final details of hand over of stores etc.   20 ORs retransferred to 44^th Bn. RTR.   

29

Halt at Amiriya for breakfast 07.00 hours.   Arrive at El Giza 15.30 hours.    RASC tpt. to camp at Beni Yusef.

30

CO’s conference on training.   Interior economy.  Bn. strength :-  37 Officers & 573 ORs.

July 1941

Commanding Officer: Lt Col H D Drew, OBE, MC

Beni Yusef

1

Individual training under Bn. arrangements. CO on leave. Major R.D.W. Uniacke takes command of the Bn. Bn. strength:- 39 Officers & 552 ORs.

2

Individual training under Bn. arrangements. Drill Cadre for young officers under Adjutant.

3

Individual training under Bn. arrangements. Mess meeting. 2/Lt. R.G. Goodyear messing officer. Organised games commenced. Capt. A.C. Doyle games officer.

4

Individual training under Bn. arrangements. Courses on new tanks commence at Abbassia. Capt. A.P. Southon, 2/Lt. N.C. Moss, 2/Lot. S.F.T.B. Lever and 26 ORs.

5

Individual training under Bn. arrangements.

6

Voluntary Church Services.

7)

Individual training under Bn. arrangements. 

11

Lt. Col. H.D. Drew, O.B.E., M.C., resumes command of the Battalion.

12

Individual training under Bn. arrangements.

13

Voluntary Church Services.

14-19

Individual training under Bn. arrangements. Bn. strength:- 40 Officers & 556 ORs. 1^st Gunnery course at Abbassia completed.

20

Voluntary Church Services.

21

Instructors classes on new armament formed but unable to proceed as new guns cannot be obtained. Further gunnery course at Abbassia. Junior NCOs Cadre course commences. Bn. strength:- 39 Officers and 546 ORs.

22

Warning order from 1 Armoured Brigade, to be prepared for concentration at El Hammam by 28^th July 41. First American M.3 tank received. CO conducts sand table exercise for all Bn. Officers.

23

Gunnery courses on new weapons commences. Wireless courses on new set commence. D and M courses on M.3 Tank commence.

24

Individual training under Bn. arrangements.

25

On order 1 AB/17/G the move to El Hammam is cancelled.

26

Individual training under Bn. arrangements.

27

Voluntary Church Services.

28-31

Individual training under Bn. arrangements. CO conducts sand table exercise fo0r all Bn. Officers. Brigadier A.H. Gatehouse visits the CO. Bn. strength 37 Officers & 519 Other Ranks.

The policy of the training for the month of July has been dictated by (a) knowledge that the Battalion is to be equipped with the new American M.3 Tank and (b) a complete lack of any kind of equipment. Until the 21st when those members of the unit undergoing courses on the new tanks, weapons and radio returned, general training only was possible. 

August 1941

Commanding Officer:  Lt Col H D Drew, OBE, MC

Beni Yusef

1

Individual training under Bn arrangements.

2

One M3 tank received.

3

Voluntary church services.

4

Individual training under Bn arrangements.

5

Individual training under Bn arrangements.

6

CO goes to forward area to attend demonstration.

7

Individual training under Bn arrangements.

8

Major Uniacke and IO with Brigadier to position S of camp on short reconnaissance of future training area.

9

CO’s parade.

10

Voluntary church services.

11

LtCol Drew resumes command.

12

CO conducts sand table exercise for all officers.

13

Individual training under Bn arrangements.

Officers Navigation Course to point 120 miles SW of Beni Yusef.

14

Individual training under Bn arrangements.

Bn strength:- 40 Offs, 517 ORs.

15)

Individual training under Bn arrangements.

17

Voluntary church services.

18

CO conducts sand table exercise in preparation for Bde tactical discussion.

19)

Individual Training under Bn arrangements.

21

12 M3 tanks received.

22)

Individual training under Bn arrangements.

24

Voluntary church services.

25

Senior NCOs Navigation course to point 120 miles SW of Beni Yusef.

26

5 M3 tanks received.

27

CO returns from hospital.

28

LtCol Drew resumes command of Bn.

29

Major Uniacke lectures all officers on proposed new composition and disposition of B Echelon.

30

Individual training under Bn arrangements.

31

Voluntary church services.

Tank state:- 31 M3 American light tanks. (3 training tanks)

Vehicle state:- 39 x 3-tonners

7 x Utility (Fords)

4 x 15-cwt trucks.

September 1941

Commanding Officer: Lt Col H D Drew, OBE, MC

Beni Yusef

1

Sqn. and tp. training every day except Sunday when voluntary church parades were held. Bn. strength 39 Officers & 526 ORs.

2

2/Lt. J.H.W. Hawgood to M.E.R.A.C. School and base depot for wireless course.

3

Col. Willison and CO inspect modifications on M.3.

5

8 M.3s received. Total 39.

7

Bn. strength 39 Officers & 541 Other Ranks.

9

46 Other Ranks from R.A.C. base depot posted to this unit training as a separate entity prior to being posted to Sqns.

11

Brigadier and CO make further inspections of modifications on M.3.

12

2/Lt. C.R. Vanes admitted to hospital and struck off strength of this unit – posted to X (II).

13

Browning firing carried out under CO.

14

Bn. strength 38 Officers & 591 Other Ranks.

16

Capt. G.J. Gilpin (T/Major) awarded the Military Cross for Gallantry in Action. (Appendix to General Order ME No. 57 dated 27^th June, 1941).

17

“A” Sqn. commenced range firing under CO.

18

“A/B” and HQ Sqns. range firing.

19

HQ and “B” Sqns. firing.

20

“C” Sqn. firing. 4 – M.3. received. Total 43. (including 3 training tanks).

21

9 M.3s received. Total 52. Bn. strength 38 Officers and 590 ORs.

22

“C” Sqn. fire Battle Practice conducted by CO. Capt. D.N. MacDonald posted away from this unit to HQ (AFV) Western Army. 3 M3s. received. Total 55. One M.3. to RAC base depot. Total 54.

23

“A” and “B” Sqns. fire battle practice conducted by CO. Practice attended by General Haining and General Cunningham. 1 M.3. to 1 Armrd. Brigade. Total 53 M3s.

24

2/Lt. R.G. Goodyear admitted to 15 General Hospital. Struck off strength of this unit and posted to X (II) list.

25

Demonstration attack on transport by “C” Sqn. Demonstration attended by General Auchinleck and CO. One M.3. to OFR Mena. Total 52 M.3s.

27

HQ and “B” Sqns. range firing.

28

HQ and “B” Sqns. Battle practice conducted by CO.

29

Reinforcements complete training and are posted to Sqns. Captain Kelsey, M.O. rejoins unit.

30

Bn. strength 36 Officers & 587 Other Ranks. “A” Vehicle state 52 M.3s. “B” Vehicle state 72 3 – ton; 8 15-cwt.; 12 8-cwt. P.U.; 7 Utility; 6 M/cycles.

In addition to Sqn. and Tp. training the following number of ORs received individual training in the subjects listed. These were carried out by Sqn. arrangement.

D. & M. 22.; Gunnery 54; Wireless 15; Driving 55.

October 1941

Commanding Officer: Lt Col H D Drew, OBE, MC

Beni Yusef

1

Bn. Wireless Exercise conducted by 1 i/c (Major R.D.W Uniacke). C.O. commanding Lt.Col. J.C. Bowring, OBE. MC. attached to the unit.

2

No incident to report.

3

Bn. Exercise. Attack on Tank column. C.O. conducting.

4

No incident to report.

5

No incident to report.

6

Bn. Exercise. C.O. controlling, 2 i/c commanding. Changes of direction and attack on Tank column.

7

Advance Party left Beni Yusef.

Lt. B.E. Stone posted to HQ 4 Armd Bde w.e.f. 26/9/41 as L.O. posted to x(i) list and struck off strength if this unit.

2/Lt. E.P Chave regraded as ‘B’ for a period of 3 months on 17/9/41. By Medical Board held at No.60 General Hospital

A/Captains D.N. Macdonald, F Steevens, S.J Hennings, J.D. Stoward to be Temporary Captains. w.e.f. 18/7/41. Auth:- Appdx to serial G.O.. M.E.F. 26/9/41.

Beni Yusef/

8

Road Party left Beni Yusef. Stayed night at Amiriya.

Amiriya

Tanks left in two trains night 8/9th

9

Road Party to Matruh Area and stayed night.

Matruh

Tank Trains arrived Charing Cross 2020 hrs.

Kanayis

10

Road Parry arrives Kanayis.

Tanks reached leaguer area.

11

4 Armd Bde Movement Order N0.3 for move at 0700 hrs 12 Oct.

2/Lieut. D.J. Browne evacuated to clearing station MATRUH.

Kanayis/

12

Bn. moved to Sidi Abbas in Alam Haleiquat area. Centre line 684314 – 650318 – 644324.

S. Abbas

Bn. moved in Triple Line Ahead, Tanks leading.

Very bad going and sqns, reported excessive track wear. C.O. inspected and reported to Bde.

S. Abbas

13

Further inspection and discussion re tracks.

14

No incident to report.

15

Recce. By I.O. (Lieut. H.J Garton-stone) to Rear Div.

16

Recce. By I.O. and Sqn Navigators to Sidi Barrani areas

17

No incident to report.

18

No incident to report.

19

Inter sqn Exercise. ‘A’ and ‘C’ Sqns alternatively moving as Enemy Tank Columns, other Sqns attacking. Conducted by C.O..

Bde Link Wireless Exercise.

20

Exercise for ‘B’ Sqn similar to that on 19^th against M.T. representing tanks

21

No incident to report.

22

2 i/c Recced. south for going for Training. Nothing suitable.

23

Colonel Barclay Miller and Major Colby, U.S. Army visited to discuss tracks situation.

24

Bde ad Bn I.Os recced Kenayis Area for traininh purposes.

Lt.Col. J.C. Bowring OBE. MC. leaves to join HQ 7 Armd Div.

Sidi Abbas

25

No incident to report.

26

No incident to report.

27

Bn. Wireless Exercise conducted by 2 i/c C.O. commanding.

28

Warning order for move back to Kanayis Area. Tanks to be carried on Transporters.

Sidi Addas/

29

‘B’ Echelon moved to Deir el Qat’ami area

Deir el Qat’ami

Orders received to move to Bir Washka area.

Bir Washka

30

Moved to new leaguer. Tanks arrived on Transporters 1300 hours.

31

Recce for new Area Qaret el Arga 20 miles South.

Awaiting new tracks for tanks.

November 1941

Commanding Officer: Lt Col H D Drew, OBE, MC

BIR WASHKA

1

All tanks in Bn. were refitted with tracks owing to damage caused by recent move to Sidi ABBAS

692312

2

Bn. moved 20 miles South to previously reconnoitred training area, and leaguered West of Bir HILU on SIWA track 661289.

Bir HILU

3

No incident to report.

4/5

Two day Brigade Exercise carried out, comprising march of CL to concentration area; night leaguer; 1 Company 2 Scots Guards co-operating at 638287; breaking leaguer and attack on enemy column. 2 R.H.A. F.O.O’s co-operating in support.

Bir HILU

5

No incident to report.

7

No incident to report.

Strength of Bn. 34 Officers 573 Other Ranks.

8/9

C.O. 2 i/c. Adjt. Major Castle, Major Gilpin, and Major Sherley Price proceed in transport to represent 5th Bn. R.T.R. in Bde exercise carried out by 3rd Bn. R.T.R.

10

No incident to report.

11

Conference at Bde on which C.Os were given preliminary confidential information on pending operations.

12

Visit by Comd. Australian Armd. Div.

Bir HILU

13

Conference at Brigade.

Bir

14

Bn. moved to concentration area near Bir DIGMAISH.

BASUR

Leaguered night at Dir BASUR 575288.

Bir

15

Arrived concentration area South of Bir DIGMAISH 546313.

DIGMAISH

16

No incident to report.

Strength of Bn. 34 Officers 581 Other Ranks.

17

Conference at Brigade for all down to, and including Squadron Commanders.

Western Desert

18

Ref. Map SOLUM – TOBRIK 1/250,000 Sheet3.

BIR DIGMAISH

0600

The Bn. crossed Bde Start Line – cairns four miles South of Bir DIGMAISH

Bde. Order of March:- 8th Hussars

Bde. H.Q.

5 R. Tanks

3 R. Tanks

0830

Reached Frontier wire gap 70. Passed through wire and moved up to replenishment area – about three mile East of wire.

1030

Replenish completed.

Note:- Major R.D.W. UNIACKE (2nd-in-Comd) had gone forward on night 17/18th in charge of Bde. Replenishment Party.

1130

Bde. resumed advance ‘Two Up’

5 R. Tanks - Right

8 Hussars – Left

3 R. Tanks – In reserved.

18

Centre Line – Pt. 186 Map Ref/ 492316 to GABR TAIE BEL ESSEM Map Ref. 464359.

1300

Information from Bde. that K.D.Gs. reported in contact with enemy patrols in area TRIGH-el-ABD. Tank camouflage shields discard at about 476340.

1430

Message from Bde. asking if we could assist Armd. Cars in area – BIR GIBNI. Advance continued and contact made with Armd. Car patrol about three miles Southwest BIR GIBNI. O.C. Armd. Car patrol confirmed previous information, but had no accurate information of recent enemy movements as they had lose touch.

Bn. was now moving ‘One UP’. “A” Sqn. leading with “C” Rt. and “B” Left in reserve.

When approaching TRIGH-el-ABD. about one mile West of BIR GIBNI leading tanks were fired on by four 8 wheeled Armd. Cars and some A.T. guns.

“A Sqn. engaged and pursed supported by “C” Sqn. The enemy made off at speed and contact was lost.

1600 to 1630

Probably no damaged inflicted on enemy. Adjt’s (Capt F.W. COOMBES) tank hit by 37mm. shell. Wireless set smashed, no casualties.

1700 to

Bn. occupied Leaguer Area, being dispersed in Sqn. Leaguers,

1800

R.H.Q. and “B” Sqn. at Pt.190, Map Ref. 472356. “C” Sqn. about 470360. “A” San, DIR-el-BARRANI 466364.

1900

Bde. issued orders that at first light on 19th, the 5th Bn. would Recce. battle positions in area BIR UAAR – BIR-el-HAMARIN – BU MELIHA 478372.

19

0700

Information from Bde. Enemy Infantry and guns dug in near BIR GUBNI. Enemy Armd. Cars and A.T. Guns in area – BU MELIHA and BIR EL GRASA. Bn. was to engage enemy reported, vigorously and assist Armd. Cars to push on.

B Sqn. (Capt. A.C. DOYLE) with H.I. Bty support were ordered to engage and destroy enemy BIR GIBNI.

“C” Sqn. to attack enemy BU MELIHA. “A Sqn. to attack BIR-EL-GRASA.

When “B” Sqn. advanced it found that the Tps. reported as enemy BIR GIBNI were some of our own Inf. and guns. “B” Sqn. then moved back into reserved and H.I. Bty moved in support of “C” Sqn.

Both “A” and “C2 Sqns. soon made contact with enemy Armd. Cars and A.T. Guns and carried out independent running fights throughout the morning. One 8 whd. Armd. Car and one lorry were destroyed, and the remainded of enemy retired rapidly in Northeasterly direction.

The advance halted at about BIR EL HAMARIN.

One of our tanks knocked out and destroyed by fire – Lieut N.C. MOSS and crew all casualties from burns.

1430

Bn. ordered to move back to area BIR EL BARRANI.

Information from Bde. that 8 Hussars were being attacked by enemy tanks East of GABR SALEH. The Bn. to move at once to TRIGH EL ADB. At about 457362 and assist.

1630

The Bn. came into action on left flank of 8 H. Enemy did not press home attack and owing to failing light there was little effective action by either side. Enemy withdrew at dark and Bde. leaguered in area about two miles East of GABR TAIE DEL ESSEM.

No personnel casualties in last action. Two tanks, mechanical casualties, both recovered.

20

0545

Bde. Orders. It was thought that the enemy tank formation had leaguered previous nighty only a few miles West of Bde. leaguer.

The Bde. would advance and engaged, Centre Line TAIE DEL ESSEM – GABR SALEH. Bn. advances ‘One UO’ “C” Sqn. leading. “A” Left. “B” Right in reserve.

0700

“C” Sqn. reported large numbers on enemy tanks stationary near Pt. 189 Map Ref. 463353 and about 3.000 yds distant. “C” Sqn. ordered to continue advance and demonstrate. Almost immediately afterwards enemy opened fire with Mk.III and IB tanks and at least two supporting batteries (‘105mm’.)

The ground was undulating and “C” Sqn were able to take up ‘Hull Dow’ positions on a fairly wide front about 1200 yds from leading enemy tanks which they started to engaged.

0720

Comd. “A” Sqn. (Major L SHERLEY-PRICE) ordered to come up to Comd. 5 R Tanks for verbal orders.

0725

Comd. 5 R Tanks issued verbal orders for right flank attack by “A” Sqn. At the same time Bde. were requested to arrange artillery support.

“C” Sqn. were ordered to close for action at the same time as “A” Sqn. attacked from right. With the assistance of the guns and the rising sun – which was at our backs – and made enemy fire inaccurate, the actions of there two Sqns. were very successful. Both closed to withing 700 or 800 yds of enemy and developed rapid and accurate fire. The fire of enemy tanks and Batteries was now intense but not very accurate.

0740

Comd. “B” Sqn. ordered to report to Comd. 5 R Tanks for verbal orders.

0745

Comd “C” Sqn. reported running short of ammunition. At the same time Comd. “B” Sqn. ordered to take his Sqn. forward into the gap between “A” and “C” and cover withdrawal of “C” Sqn. to replenish.

0800

“C” Sqn, withdrew to replenish ammunition.

Enemy tanks now started to move forward on our Southern flank

Bde. were asked to provide help on this flank.

0815

“A” Sqn. reported – running short of ammunition – and were ordered to withdraw to replenish. “B” Sqn. informed they were the only Sqn. then in action and must hang on and cover replenishment.

0815 to

“B” Sqn. were forced to withdraw half a mile by enemy threat on left flank.

0845

0845

8 Hussars and 3 R. Tanks moved up forward in support and enemy advance discontinued.

0930

Enemy broke off action and withdrew in North Westerly direction.

Bn. withdrawing to Bde. reserved.

Casualties:- 5 of our tanks destroyed.

Personnel:- Lieut. C.C.T, HAWKINS wounded.

Many other tanks hit but without suffering serious damage or casualties.

Impossible to estimate the number of enemy tanks knocked out.

With the exception of two all were recovered.

20

Comd. “A” Sqn. reported that his Sqn, had definitely knocked out eight. “C” Sqn. reported man hits at effective range and silenced. Probably at least twenty tanks put out of action. This estimate was supported by large numbers of tanks seen on recovery vehicles during their retreat next day and found abandon at later date in the GAMBUT Area.

1100

Bde. ordered to continue advance. 8 Hussars Right. 3 R. Tanks left. 5th R Tanks-Reserve, and to move forward to a line of observation facing North on a general line running East and West Pt. 189. Map Ref. 460368.

1500

Bn. ordered to move forward and take up positions of observation on right of 8 Hussars North of BIR EL BARRANI.

1600

Shortly after reaching BIR EL BARRANI – informed by Bde. that 3 R. Tanks were being heavily attacked on left flank. The Bn. was to move at once in rear of 8 Hussars and come up in support of 3 R. Tanks. The Bn. at once moved at speed come into action on left of 3 R. Tanks, about six miles, with half an hour. The situation was very confused – both 3 R. Tanks and 8 Hussars were being heavily attacked and were withdrawing rather quickly.

To start with “B” and “C” Sqns were put into action with “A” Sqn. in reserved, but the latter was soon engaged, as the withdrawal on our right and left was continuing and enemy tanks advances on both these sides, the Bn. was forces to withdraw slowly.

The Bn. withdrawal remained orderly and under full control. Sqns. being alternative leap-frogged whenever the withdrawal was forces on us. Throughout this very difficult action, all Sqn. Comds. showed excellent coolness and power of command. The Bn. remained in action until darkness, when it rallied and withdrew one mile East.

Casualties:- One tank destroyed. Cpl Heathcock (Driver) killed. Cpl, Noirmot and crew missing. Two Officers killed – Capt, W.E.F. WINNEY and 2nd Lieut. H.S.S. LESTER.

Again quite impossible to estimate enemy casualties as he remained in possession of ground and recovered all tanks. Enemy casualties probably light owing to setting sun making our shooting difficult and because of failure to obtain any flank attack against enemy.

1900

The Bn. ordered to leaguer in its present position. Comd. 5 R Tanks informed Bde. the Germans were extremely close; some not more that 1000 yds away; asking permission to leaguer further East.

2000

Bn. ordered to move one mile further East and leaguer.

One Coy. Scots Guards joined the Bn. in leaguer to provide local protection.

It was now known that the Bde. had been engaged all day by the whole of 15th Panzer Div.

2100

Bde. orders received that 22 Armd. Bde. had arrived from EL GUBI and were about four miles to our Northwest.

In the morning the 4 Armd. Bde and 22 Armd. Bde. would resume attack on the 15th Armd. Div

21

0645

Bde. resumed advance. 5th Bn. Right – 3 R. Tanks left – 8 Hussars Reserve and H.I. Bty in Support of 5 R. Tanks. Centre Line – Bearing 350° from Pt. 188 Map Ref. 467357

During the early morning from about 0400 hrs. a great deal of enemy tank movement had been heard, although the direction of movement was not clear. Soon after start two abandoned German Mk.II Tanks were found and several prisoners taken, and be-came evident that the enemy were withdrawing rapidly in a general North Westerly direction.

0900

At about 0900 hrs. the first visual contact with the enemy was made when large columns of MET were seen with numbers of tanks of tow or on transporters. One Mk.III tank was abandon by enemy and destruction completed.

0930

About 0930 hrs. a group of enemy A.T. guns reported by “B” Sqn, who were leading – about 2,000 yards to their left front.

H.I. Bty. were ordered to go into action and be prepared to support attacked. H.I. Bty. fired short and very accurate concentrations and “C” Sqn, moved forward quickly to attack. When “C” Sqn. were still over 1.000 yds from the enemy they abandoned their position leaving three wrecked vehicles and a few prisioners.

Shortly after this “A” Sqn. on the right; captured one light A.T. Gun and about 15 prisoners. Total number of prisoners : once officer and 20 other ranks – all of 15th Panzer Div. All this time a large enemy column could be seen withdrawing in a North Westerly direction and a similar column in North Easterly direction. The nearest vehicles being about 5,000 yds from our leading tps.

H.I. Bty engaged with gun fire, but Bn. was ordered not to press on as 3rd Bn. had encountered more opposition on left and had suffered some casualties.

These small actions had taken place in area just North of BIR EL MELIHA Map Ref. 464384.

1300

The Bde. was ordered to resume advance, changing direction left, Centre Line – BU MELIHA – BIR EL RECHEM Map Ref. 441393.

8 Hussars leading – 3 R. Tanks protection right – 5 R. Tanks in reserve,

1500

At about 1500 hrs. Bde. ordered to form “Two Up” 5 R. Tanks coming up on left of 8 Hussars. The sky now became overcast and it started to dizzle.

1600

The rain had increased and visibility became increasingly bad not more that 4,000 yds at this time. Comd. 5 R. Tanks ordered leading Sqn. “C” to move more cautiously in view of danger of bumping into enemy A.T. Guns,

1630

Bde. ordered Bn. to mover across to the right to the assistance of 8 Hussars who had bumped into trouble. This order was almost immediately cancelled and Bn. was ordered to more forward into leaguer near BIR EL RECHEM. Rain now very heavy, and ground rapidly becoming very boggy.

Comd. “A” Ech. Tpt. (Lieut. G. BULLETT) reported difficulty with vehicles sticking. The fighting Ech. leaguered about 1800 hrs, but tpt. failed to reach leaguer being all stuck in mud.

Casualties throughout day.

Tanks:- Nil

Personnel. Nil

22

0100

Orders from Bde. An enemy Column has leaguered night about five miles Southwest of Bde. leaguer. The Bde. in co-operation with other Cols. would attack this leaguer at first light.

0500

The Bn. moved out of leaguer with H.I. Bty in Spt. at first light.

It was found – enemy Col. had gone during the night. No contact was made.

0800

Bde. was ordered to rally back at night leaguer area. All Comds. to report to Bde. for orders. Bde. Comds, orders.

The 7th Armd. Bde. had been heavily engaged in area SIDI REZEGH and 4th Armd. Bde, would be ready to move to their assistance at half hours notice.

0830

3 R. Tanks reported about 20 enemy tanks to the North and 2,000 yds away – then advancing in direction of Bde. H.Q.

The Bn. at once moved to engage these tanks but found information inaccurate. The tanks reported were in fact derelicts British and German tanks and at least six miles away.

1100

Bde. ordered to advance to CARMUSET EN – NBEIDAT. 8 Hussars leading. 5 R. Tanks right. 3 R. Tanks left.

On reaching Southern edge of escarpment – 8 Hussars were to draw into reserved and 3 R. Tanks and 5 R. Tanks were to change direction left and were to take up position of observation facing slightly North an West and overlooking the area Southeast of SIDI REZEGH.

About this time it was reported that “BOOMING BILLS BOYS” (1 A. T. Bde.) were moving towards BEDFORD (BIR EL CHIETA Map Ref; 453403)

1500

The Bde. was ordered to advance to SIDI REZEGH to assistance of Spt. Gp. who were heavily engaged. Bde. advance – 5 R. Tanks Right. 3 R. Tanks Left. 8 Hussars in reserve.

1530

At about 1530 hrs. information from Bde. that Col had been reported moving West head about 8 miles West of CARMUSET EN – NBEIDAT.

On this occasion Bde. were asked whether this Col. had need identified as friendly or otherwise but this information was not supplied.

1600

The Bn. reached Pt. about ten miles South of SIDI REZEGH aerodrome. Location of aerodrome about Map Ref. 434403. Ay the Pt. Comd. 5 R. Tanks was met by Comd. 4 Armd. Bde. who was with Comd. 7 Armd. Div. At this time tremendous amount of smoke became increasingly severe.

Visibility owning to increasing duct and smoke rapidly worsened and heavy A.T. Gun opposition forced the Bn. to move further West to avoid it. In so doing the Bn. was forces off its Centre Line and became mixed with the 3rd Bn. After a good deal of difficulty but with the assistance of Comd. of Spt. Gp. who spoke to both Comds of “A” and “C” Sqns the aerodrome was located and the leading Sqns. moved forward on to it. C Sqn. engaged enemy tanks and A.T. Guns, but owing to smoke and dust only intermittent and ineffective action was possible.

Within a few minutes of going into action both leading Sqns. were fired on by tanks of 22 Armd. Bde. Comd. 5 R. Tanks managed to stop three of these tanks with an officer; but the latter had no knowledge of the situation. Owing to the dangerously confused nature of the fighting. Comd. 5 R. Tanks ordered the Bn. rally back West of the Aerodrome. This was done after consulting with Comd. 3 R. Tanks who took a similar action and reporting to Bde Comd. who approved.

1700

The Bn. rallied about one mile west of the aerodrome.

1715

Bde. Orders. Enemy Inf. were advancing across aerodrome.

The Bn. would once more advance on the aerodrome and attack and prevent Inf. from threatening our batteries which were immediately East of the aerodrome.

1720

The Bn. advance at 1720 hrs., owing to failing light and continuous heavy shelling visibility was now less than 50 yds.

The Bn. advances right across the aerodrome, the tanks engaging many enemy A.T. guns on the right flank at point blank ranges but encountered no enemy infantry. “B” Sqn. advance right up to and through large Cols. of tanks, halted East of aerodrome.

Shots were exchanged but it was quite dark and results on either side are not known.

1800

Bde. Comd. informed Comd. 5 R. Tanks that he was going back to Bde. H.Q. which was with “A” Ech. Tpt. and that the 3 R. Tanks and 5 R. Tanks would remain and rally as many tanks as they could and await further orders.

1815

The Bn. rallied back one mile West of aerodrome. The Bn. had started the morning 40 tanks strong. At 1800 hrs. only 26 tanks rallied. It is not known now many tanks were lost in each of these actions as there had been no time to complete a roll call in the space between them.

2000

Bde. Comd. reported by R.T. that he was coming back to the Bn. and we were to be prepared to direct him with a verey light.

Shortly afterwards he arrived. The information was that on approaching the “A” Ech. leaguer he had been informed by Bde. I.O. that they were surrounded and being attacked by a large number of enemy tanks, with that he returned to us.

It was afterwards found out that Sjt HUMPHREYS had taken charge of Bn. “A” Ech. Tpt. when the Bn. was attacked and had succeeded in getting all the vehicles away to the South with the exception of one ammunition and one petrol lorry which were missing and of Lieut. BULLET and his truck who were also missing.

The 3rd Bn. who only got very few tanks which had yet rallied were to remain in that position and that 5 R. Tanks were to be prepared to move back towards Bde. leaguer and to attempt to rescue them.

That night was very dark there being no moon, but the direction would be maintained by the burning Bde. H.Q. lorries which were about five miles away. The Bn. was to advance in very compact phalanx formation to within about half a mile of the Bde. leaguer when a fresh plan would be made.

2100

The Bn. advanced. Movement was extremely slow owing to darkness causing tanks to bump into each other and frequently losing touch.

Several halts had to be made en route in order to reorganise and recce. When about one mile short of the burning vehicles many lorries could be seen silhouetted in the fires. It was decided to continue the advance to within a few hundred yards of these vehicle when an officer was to go forward in a tank.

It was arranged that he should go right up to the Col. and fire a verey light to identify. He would fire M.Gs. if the Col. proved to be enemy tpt,. 37 gun if it proved to be enemy tanks.

Capt. A.C. DOYLE was ordered to carry out this task. Having fired the verey light as arranged, he was heard to fire both M.G. and 37. Many verey lights then went up, and a large Col. of enemy tanks, tpt and guns of various types could be seen drawn up in a huge semi-circle and withing 50-200 yds of the Bn.

Capt. DOYLE came back quickly in his tank and all tanks of the Bn. opened rapid M.G fire against the enemy Col. For the first five or six minutes there was little response from ??? ??? and the Bn. maintained heave fire and occasionally fired 37 mm when opportunity afforded. After about six minutes heavy and light A.T. fire was opened on us, and enemy tanks close to our left rear opened fire, and several of our tanks were hit by A.T. Guns. Bn. kept up a heavy fire for about another ten minutes when the Adjt. Jumped on the C.O’s. Tank and told him the Bde. Comd. wanted him to break off the action.

ise so much that groups of them falling in on parade

Orders were at once given for the action to be broken off and the Bn. to withdraw due South. All Sgn. Comds acknowledged the order, but owing to the large proportion of tanks without wireless sets many could not have understood what the intention was. Neither is it known how many of our tanks were knocked out during this action. Eventually 16 tanks rallied during the night and moved back under the C.O. to join up with 2 R.H.A. next morning.

One tank – 2nd-in-Comds, was hit but recovered by its crew and taken back to L.R.S.

Six tanks – Capt. S.J. HENNINGS, Sjt. Naylor, Sjt. Ford. Sjt. James, Sjt. Hall and Sjt. Frys rallied back with the 3rd Bn. and remained with them for the two days. The Adjt. (Capt. F.W. COOMBES) was injured but came out on somebody elses tank. Major UNIACKE lost touch with the Bn. but, eventually rejoined on 24 Nov 41

Capt. HENNINGS and Sjt Hall rejoined with their tanks two days later. Sjt. Ford Sjt. Fry and Sgt Green. With their crews but without their tanks – which had been knocked out – rejoined three days later.

Sjt ^% Nayor and his tank has never been seen since, and is believed to have been knocked out near South Africans on the following day. These six tanks were all in action under Major SIMPSON of 3 R. Tanks on the morning of the 23rd.

% N.B. since reported P.O.W.

23.

0800

Bn, 16 tanks – gained contact with 2nd R.H.A. with 13 guns about one mile East of SIDI MOHAMED EL ABEIED. Soon after this R.T. contact was established with Comd. 4 Armd. Bde. who said he was near BIR EL REGHEM but was moving back towards Pt. 175 Map Ref. 439404

1000

At about 1000 hrs. Comd. 5 R. Tanks reported to Comd. 4 Armd. Be that the South Africans were heavily engaged about five miles to the Northwest and suggest that we should move forward to their assistance. The answer was to wait where we were until further orders owing to the threat from the South.

The Bn. with 2 R.H.A. in Spt. remainded in area until about 1615 hrs. During this period the Bn. was ordered to the assistance of the South Africans on three occasions and on each occasion the order was cancelled. The Bn. did actually move at 1630 hrs. by when Bde. H.Q. and the remains of 8 Hussars had rejoined.

The 8 Hussars then reported enemy tanks advancing from the West when they opened fire and 2 R.H.A. went into action. The Bn. pushed well forward in advance of 2 R.H.A. and 8 Hussars but saw no signs of any enemy. It is almost certain that no enemy had been engaged. As it was nearly dusk the Bde. Comd. ordered no further advance. The Bn. eventually rallied and leaguered about four miles East.

23.

During the day at intervals the Bn. had chased isolated Gps. Of German Tpt. Three vehicles had been knocked out and about 15 prisoners taken. Major SHIRLEY-PRICE at one time was ordered to chase a Col of 20 enemy vehicles but their complete destruction was prevented by Comd. 2 R.H.A. countermanding the C.Os. orders and also contrary to Bde. orders tell him to go to the South Africans. When Major SHIRLEY-PRICE’s party was eventually started on the chase it was too late to catch the Col. and only one straggling lorry was picked up.

24.

The Bde. H.Q. with some of the 3rd Bn. amd 8 Hussars had joined the Bn. on the previous evening.

0700

The Bde. moved seven miles Southeast of GHOTE EL MAHATA.

GHOTE EL MAHATA.

0900

Orders from Bde. Information – enemy Col. advancing from the North and threatening 22 Armd. Bde. who were file miles to the Northwest. The Bn. would move at once to assist 22 Armd. Bde. and would come up on their right, coming under orders Comd. 22 Armd. Bde.

0930

Move completed. Contact with 22 Armd. Bde. gained. Information confirmed.

0945

Orders from 4 Armd. Bde. that two enemy Cols. had neem located.

One moving South – about 44 Grid, and moving East – about 38 Grid. The Bn. would rally back on 4 Armd. Bde. at once ceasing to co-operate with 22 Armd. Bde.

1100

With some difficulty H.Q. 4 Armd Bde. were found and the Bn. rallied on them. The Bn. took up a position of observation facing East, at about Pt. 195 Map Ref. 453387. Previous there had been a good deal of indiscriminate artillery shelling but it was soon discovered that we were exchanging shots with South African Cols. and firing ceased. The South African Cols. were those which had previously been reported as enemy Cols.

1400

Patrols of 8 Hussars reported enemy Col. about five miles to South on bearing 146°. Bn, moved out rapidly in this direction but failed to make contact.

1500

Major SHIRLEY-PRICE who was sick and had been ordered to take back some mechanically unfit tanks to L.R.S. reported being fired on by and enemy Col. eight mile South and just North of TRIGH EL ABD in square 4436. Shortly before this Major UNIACK has assumed command. The C.O. having damaged knee. The Bn. chased the Col. for 20 miles and eventually gained contact about 8 miles SOUTHEAST of BIR EL GUBI before 1645 hrs.

^% Location Bde might know

It is impossible to give exact position of action as the advance had been extremely rapid, and the course started on a bearing of 140° frequently changed to the right and eventually ending up moving due West.

The Bn. attacked the Col. on the right flank, 3rd Bn. on the left flank. Two attacks were made. First attack could not be pressed home owing to enemy tanks and A.T. guns. The second was successful in getting in amongst the Col. and was very successful – since 40 vehicles were destroyed – heavy casualties inflicted on lorry borne infantry and 40 prisoners taken.

Two of our tanks were hit. Capt. WARD’S and Lieut. GREGOR’S. Lieut. GREGOR’S was destroyed. Capt. WARD’S tank recovered but out of action. Lieut. GREGOR wounded, Cpl. WHITFIELD died of wounds.

1800

Bde. moved four miles Northeast and leagured in the area BERRUIEB.

25.

0700

Bde. moved South for about five miles and was ordered to come into action against a Col. 500 MET. to the East. The Col. proved to be one our own convoys.

Information was received that S.Africans Bde at TAIEB el ESSEM 4336 were being attacked. Bde was ordered to move at full speed to their assistance. 5 R.Tanks Right – 3 R.Tanks Left. Owing to the usual lack of detailed information the Bn. nearly ran into the enemy A/T defence but was turned away in time and withdrew about 1200 yards. The ground afforded no possibility for manoeuvre and we were lucky to find the only hull down position there was. Several attempts to make close contact were tried without success. Fire from 50, 75 and 105 m.m was heavy and accurate and the least movement resulted in a heavy concentration. The R.H.A. put in some excellent shooting and both 3 and 5 R. Tanks remained in position protecting the guns until dusk. After dusk ordered were received to move and leaguer at about 439352.

AGHERET

SCINEIA

26.

1230

Bde. issued order for the Bde. to be ready to move 25 miles on a bearing of 1° as soon as possible.

1300

Bde. moves off. 8 Hussars leading – 3 R. Tanks right – 5 R. Tanks left – L.N. Bty in Spt. 5 R. Tanks.

1500

Bde. reached area GUBI ELINA 4327. Bn. refuelled.

1530

Orders from Bde. Enemy Col. moving Northwest along THRIGH EL ABD.

5th Bn. with L.N Bty in Spt. to purse and engage. The Col. was pursued for 16 miles until within a few miles of BIR EL GUBI.

The enemy tpt. escaped but the Bn. engaged some 10 M.13 tanks destroying two. The action was broken off at dusk and the Bn. rallied back on Bde. H.Q. near GABEA SLIMA. We suffered no casualties.

Eight joined tanks joined us in leaguer that night. For last three days Bn. had been operating with R.H.A. two tanks and one sqn of 14 tanks. Now reorganised as two Sqns. each of 11 tanks.

27

Col. Drew resumed Comd.

Until 1000 hrs. maintenance in leaguer.

1000

Bde, H.Q. called for Comds. Bde. orders. Information enemy Col. moving west along TRIGH CAPUZZO – Bde. will advance to BIR CHATRIA as quickly as possible and engage. 8 Hussars leading – 3 R. Tanks right – 5 R. Tanks left. L.N. Bty in Spt. 5 R.Tanks.

1400

8 Hussars reported large enemy Col. moving West of TRIGH CAPUZZO.

8 Hussars were drawn into reserve. 3rd and 5th Bns. Orderd to advance and engaged enemy. 5 R. Tanks advance “B” Sqn. leading “C” Sgn. in reserve.

1430

Capt. DOYLE “B” Sqn. reported being heavily fired on by A.T. guns. He was ordered to avoid by moving further West.

1445

“C” Sqn. ordered up to right of “B” Sqn. reported efforts made by both Sqns, to advance bur continual opposition by A.T. gun screen met. Two of our tanks destroyed. Comd. “B” Sqns. tank hit wireless put out of action. Capt. HENNINGS assumed Comd.

L.N. Bty engaged A.T. Guns knocking out one, and one or two A.T. guns and vehicles were knocked out by our tanks

27

1600

Bde. orders. Enemy tanks attacking 22 Armd. Bde. four miles to Northwest. Bn. ordered to advance and engaged with 3 R. Tanks on left. Bn. was unable to advance far owing to enfilade A.T. gun-fire from Rt. flank.

1630

The enemy tanks, about 40, supported by a Bty turned East and attacked the Bn. The Bn. attacked the head of the Col. and checked their advance but was unable to attack enemy flack owing to lack of cover and A.T. guns on flank. Several of our tanks were hit, but no serious damage or casualties.

Casualties for day – two tanks destroyed. Sjt. HART killed, Sjt. WILSON Killed (attached to 3 Bn. temporarily. The action continued till dark when the Bn. rallied back at BIR CHATRI

28.

Replenishment vehicles arrived first light having been delayed by enemy Col. As soon as replenished Bde. ordered to move North and engage enemy in same position as on previous night.

Bde. advance – 8 Hussars leading, 5 R. Tanks right – 3 R. Tanks left – L.N. Bty again in Spt. 5 R. Tanks.

0730

By 0730 hrs. contact with enemy tanks again made – about four miles West of BIR CHATRIA. The Bn. advance was again checked from A.T. gun enfilade fire from left flank. L.N. Bty came into action and dust created by shell fire enable both Sqns. to close to effective range and to get many hits on enemy tanks. After being in action for about ¾ of an hour ammunition was running short and Bn. was ordered to withdraw slowly to the South. The enemy tanks followed for a short while and then halted.

1000

4 Armd. Bde. (with one Sqn. 22 Armd. Bde. who had joined on the previous night_ move due west for 3½ miles and took up position facing Northwest.

1400

Sqn, 22 Armd. Bde. on right facing North – thus forming a semi-circle screen across line of advance of enemy Col. The enemy Col. advance to within 2,000yds and halted. After being engaged by our artillery the enemy tank Col. the split into two groups.

1500

One group of about 40 tanks moved across advanced to attack on left of the Bn. One group of 25 to 30 tanks moved across and attacked 3 Bn. and 22 Armd. Bde’s. Sqn on right.

AS usual in the area North of the RHIG El ABD the ground was completely devoid of any minor features to provide cover for manoeuvre. However, L.N. Bty engaged enemy tanks with frequent heavy concentrations and enable both Sqns. to carry out swift stabbing advances and close effective range for short periods.

The artillery fire in both sides was very heavy. One enemy tank was destroyed by direct hit from 25 pdrs, and several hit and silenced by own on gun fire. The action again lasted until dusk and the Bde. rallied and moved mile miles into leaguer.

Casualties:- We had five tanks hit and temporarily put out of action –(jammed turrets, wireless sets smashed, gun mountings jammed).

All were repaired in leaguer that night.

29

0730

The Bde. moved North towards the escarpment at approx. Pt. 178 Map Regt. 438401.

0800

Sighted and attacked an enemy Col. of MET. Our advance was checked by enemy A.T. guns which were engaged by 2 R.H.A.

Enemy A.T. guns withdrew when enemy Col. out of range.

0900

We advanced again and sighted further tpt. moving West in the valley South of SIDI REZEGH. This Col. was shelled by our gunners but Bde. shortly afterwards reported Col. as being friendly.

Bde. was ordered to rally back and take up position facing East. 8 Hussars Right – 5th Bn. Left – 3 rd Bn. in reserve.

The Bde. remained in this position for about three hours.

1400

Bde. ordered to advance in Northeasterly direction bearing 30° 5th Bn. L.N. Bty protection left.

1500

The Bde. ordered to change direction right and move on a bearing of 50°. At about this time the Bn. sighted a large Col. apparently of tanks about two miles to the West. Comd. 5 R.T.R. requested Bde. for identification of this Col. Answer from Bde. “JUMBOS BOYS” (Major PHILLIPS – 8 Hussars with scratch crews) was sending out patrols.

1515

Bde. H.Q. order the Bde. to advance on new centre line. Comd. 5 R. Tanks informed Bde, He has seen JUMBO’S BOYS moving in wrong direction and did not intend to advance on new Centre Line until the Col. to the West was identified and proposed to sent out patrol from 5 R. Tanks. Bde. approved.

The patrol of “B” Sqn. was fired on by enemy tanks after moving out about a 1,000 yds – immediately “B” Sqn. were ordered to go into action facing West. The enemy tanks started to advance rapidly. “C” Sqn was ordered to go into action on right of “B” Sqn. facing Southwest. The enemy tanks between 10 and 50 in number, supported by heavy artillery fire from 105 and 88 mm guns, continued to advance.

1530.

“C” Sqn. Comd, reported visibility bad owing to dust and sqn. The enemy attack was now directed against the left of “B” Sqn. “C” Sqn. were ordered to disengage and come into again on left of “B” Sqn.

A heavy engagement following during which all tanks had to be replenished with ammunition. Visibility was extremely bad to dust and sun but the Bn. managed to maintain its position and stope the enemy advance. Bn. remained in action until dusk.

“JUMBOS BOYS” had been placed under command of 5 R. Tanks but he had not been employed but had been kept in reserve owing to state of disorganisation there were in,

Our casualties:- Capt. WARD’s Tank destroyed and Capt. WARD wounded and

Several other tanks hit but not seriously damaged. Capt, HENNINGS assumed command of “C” Sqn. until end of action.

Note:- Wireless. It should be pointed out at this stage that control of the Bn. and Sqns. had become increasingly difficult during the last few days owing to the deterioration of wireless sets from lack of maintenance and to the number that had been destroyed by enemy fire. At no time during this period did Sgns. Have more than three sets working and on several occasions only one serviceable set remained in each Sqn.

29

Enemy casualties unknown but again one tank was seen to be destroyed by direct hit from 25 pdr.

The Bde. again withdrew about five miles to the South to leaguer after dusk.

30

Three new tanks with scratch crews reported to the Bn. at fist light bring strength up to 26.

0700

The Bn. advanced North in direction of CARMUSET EN NBEIDAT.